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Abstract
Title of dissertation: SMART CARDS AS PROOF OF SEAFARERS’
IDENTITY AND CERTIFICATE
Degree:

MSc

The dissertation is a study of the seafarers’ identity (SID) and Certificates of
Competency (CoC) documents, with a view to combine the two into one.
A brief look is taken at the history of identification and certification of seafarers and
the importance of identity and certificate documents is described. Relevant rules and
regulations in this respect are described and the changes that have been made to the
documents and the methods and the reasons behind the changes are also examined.
Current methods used by different States are explained and the relevant problems
and implications are introduced, including the issue of shore leave and fraudulent
practices in the certification of seafarers.
Recent changes in the identification and certification of seafarers are analysed in
more detail and the status of the new ILO convention number 185 (C185) about
seafarers’ certificates is investigated. The role of technology in this area is described
by first reviewing the two major elements, i.e. biometrics and smart card technology.
Different biometric identifiers are also described and compared, and various card
types are introduced. The combination of the two is also covered, followed by a
scientific analysis of which combination best suits document for identity and
certificates of seafarers.
The chosen combination of biometrics/card in the ILO proposed solution is then
examined based on the findings of the previous discussions.
Then the idea of Seafarers’ Identity and Certificates document (SIC) is introduced,
which is a combination of the SID and CoC. The idea is further developed by
examining different aspects, such as the requirements, conditions, pros and cons and
obstacles. Finally, several measures are introduced to tackle the problems, which is
necessary for a successful implementation of the new document.
Keywords: Identification, Certification, SID, CoC, SIC, biometrics, smart card,
shore leave, fraudulent practices
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1. Introduction
Shipping is a demanding business; while the world economy depends on it and
around 90% of the world cargo (in volume) is transported by sea (Doumbia-Henry,
2003, p. 130), several obstacles threaten this global industry. Seafaring is, in itself, a
difficult job and the number of seafarers is declining. (BIMCO, ISF, & U. Warwick
2000) However, there are certain problems in this business that are forced from
outside. For example, one of the major difficulties that seafarers experience today is
the refusal to be allowed shore leave, which is one of the fundamental rights of the
seafarers. This is a direct result of the security concerns imposed from outside the
shipping sector.

Another serious problem of the shipping world is “fraudulent

practices” in the certification of seafarers, which is rooted mostly in financial
problems, and imperils the safety of shipping, as well as the marine environment.
Seafarers need to have their basic rights to satisfactorily perform their duties.
However, the immigration authorities in most countries need credible proof of
identity, as well as any other evidence, to ensure that the person going ashore is a
genuine seafarer. Furthermore, the industry needs seafarers to have the required
qualifications. This is mostly to promote the safety of shipping and protection of the
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marine environment, by lowering the probability of having accidents, which are
believed to be 80% due to human error. (Schröder, 2004)
Documents have been used for a long time to satisfy both needs, but the problem is
that they are not tamper proof. For this reason, along with the other drivers of
change, ILO proposed a new document for the identification of seafarers in its C185
convention, which was adopted on 19 June 2003. However, the new document has
not succeeded, and the problem persists.

Moreover, the ILO solution only

considered the issue of identity as an urgent matter and without enough time and
effort to consider all the relevant aspects of the problem. Yet, part of this problem,
i.e. the certificates was not addressed.
The above circumstances are causing major difficulties for seafarers, who are not
allowed to go ashore after long working periods onboard. Furthermore, they suffer
from long inspections of their certification documents by Port State Control officers
and Flag State inspectors, due to the highlighted problem of fraudulent certificates.
Shipowners and Flag States also suffer from this situation, as the inspections and
detentions result in delays, which lead to financial losses, as well as the resulting
dissatisfaction among the crews. The boom in security has a role to play in making
the conditions even more complicated. Nevertheless, the position of the USA is an
important factor, which can change the state of affairs at any time. The fact that the
USA does not accept the ILO proposed solution is a significant deterrent for the
international community to ratify the ILO C185 convention.
However, there should be a solution to this problem. Even if the ILO document does
not work, other solutions could be sought to rectify the hindrances and find a way
out. Although the current focus of IMO and many other maritime entities is on
security, identification and certification of seafarers should be placed on the agenda
by considering all the relevant discussions. This approach can lead to a rational,
internationally accepted, and working solution.
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1.2. Preceding studies conducted on relevant subjects
Although biometrics and smart cards have a short history, due to the growing
application of them for different purpose, they are being increasingly respected. For
this reason, there are many sources of information and numerous researches done on
each.

Combination of biometrics and smart cards is also well considered by

researchers and the industry. However, application of smart cards for seafarers is
quite a new subject. It was only after the Liberian Register started to test a new
document for its seafarers and the ILO initiated the new identity document that the
idea was developed. The history of using biometrics and cards for seafarers does not
exceed three years, and therefore, it is not easy to find preceding research in this
area.
ILO must have performed some studies before adoption of the new convention
(International Labour Organization, 2003), as well as the Liberian Register, before
starting its trial application of the new seafarers’ ID cards. During this research, it
has been tried to get as much information as possible using different available
sources, but access to such researches was not facilitated, since, for example,
companies rarely unleash technical information which can threaten their position in
the market.

1.3. The objectives
This study tries to review the identification and certification of seafarers over time,
and to identify current practice and relevant issues and debates in this concern,
including the initiatives for change and the results.

It also focuses on the

technological side to provide an analysis of the most suitable methodologies and
equipment. However, the main objective is to examine the idea of a combined
identity and certificate document, and the different solutions for this purpose. To
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achieve this, different biometric identifiers and cards are examined to find out which
best suit the requirements of the identification and certification of seafarers.
In doing so, the research does not try to find a definite solution. Rather, it tries to
highlight some aspects, and show certain ideas in dealing with the issue, which can
be considered as an outline for the actual practical solutions.

1.4. Methodology
This study tries to review current state of seafarers’ identification and certification,
analyse the situation to achieve better understanding of the important factors and
drivers of change, the changes that have happened so far, and then, by considering all
relevant factors and circumstances, tries to come up with the idea of a solution to
solve the problems. The study is intended to have a practical view. To this end,
contacts have been made with experts, manufacturers and service providers in this
area and the results are reflected in the work.

1.5. Limitations of the study
This study was undertaken and done under a limited time of less than 8 weeks. On
the other hand, as the subject is new, there were not enough resources and references
at hand.
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Chapter 2
Background

2.1. Introduction
Identification has always been a matter of concern for human beings. People in
small communities recognize others by looking at and listening to them, but for
bigger societies with large populations, more sophisticated methods of authentication
seem to be necessary. In fact, in a big community with hundreds of thousands of
people, it is neither accurate nor possible to authenticate people by looking at their
faces or listening to them. So, they started to use symbols as proof of identity (what
you have). By personalizing symbols, like writing a name or any other individual
mark on it, identity documents came into existence. In this way, everybody had their
own identity document and had to carry and present it whenever needed. Identity
documents have long been used for authentication.
Documents as proof of identity
Later on, application of documents as proof of identity for access control became
common practice. This kind of control was applied in the entries to certain public or
private locations like buildings and airplanes, or to control access to a resource such
as getting money from a bank. However, the checking and authentication process
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was still being done manually (by human beings.) Then came the development of
Information Technology (or “IT”) and the movement towards automation also
affected authentication methods. The idea was to replace people, who performed the
checking and recognitions, with machines. To use machines for this purpose, the
documents had to change to machine-readable formats. Even then, authentication
was based on “what a person had” in hand, i.e. the document. Then, as the use of
codes and passwords became more common, another factor of “knowledge” came to
help the authentication process. In this way, only the person who knew a secret code
or password would be successfully authenticated. Yet, it was possible for a person
who could, somehow, access the document and knowledge to impersonate another
one and falsely enter a location or use a service. The next step was to use something
for authentication that is permanently bound to the individuals and cannot be stolen
or imitated, such as biometrics. Biometrics was already a known subject in terms of
criminal law enforcement procedures when it entered the domain of personal
authentication.

So, authentication has gradually become stronger by the use of

“What one has”, “What one knows”, and “What one is.”

2.2. Seafarers’ identity
In the shipping world, which is a global industry, identification plays an important
role. A vessel’s crew members, who are not necessarily nationals of the Flag State,
need to identify themselves at different stages of their job; so, they need an identity
document. To solve the problem, States have established their systems to issue
appropriate “Seafarers’ Identity Document” or SID. However, these systems were
designed to satisfy the requirements of individual States. In other words, each State
could not recognize the identity documents issued by other States, as there was little
harmonization in the issuance system. Regional cooperation among several States to
accept each other’s SIDs could be a good solution to this end, but not enough to
entirely solve the problem for this global industry.
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2.2.1. Discussions at ILO
The International Labour Organization (ILO), founded in 1919, is the first
specialized agency of the United Nations.

This organization tries to bring

governments, employers and workers’ unions together for united action to achieve
social justice and better living conditions for workers all over the world. (DoumbiaHenry, 2000, p. 1) This objective is achieved through a special tripartite structure,
i.e. the there kinds of delegates to ILO; Government delegates, Workers’ delegates
and Employers’ delegates. Relying on this tripartite construction, ILO tries to make
a balance among all the stakeholders, which is a good policy to guarantee success for
its conventions.
ILO also involves seafarers, as a specific class of workers with special circumstances
and requirements. Feeling the need for special privileges to be granted to seafarers
regarding their movements all over the world, the ILO started preparatory work in
London in 1956 to come up with a measure to facilitate international recognition of
seafarers’ identity documents so that seafarers can easily enter the territories of other
countries for the purpose of shore leave, transit movement, or any reason
independent on their own will. (International Labour Organization, 1959)
Two years later, the drafting committee presented its proposed convention to the 41st
session of the International Labour Conference. A review on the discussions at the
conference, as well as those in the seafarers’ identity card committee, can show some
of the concerns in this respect at that time. One interesting point is that prior to the
adoption, the name of the proposed convention and the committee has the words
“identity card” in it, which implies the original intention of the drafters to design a
card-like document.
The record of proceedings of the 41st session of the International Labour Conference
shows that Seafarers’ unions were in favour of an internationally acceptable
document for seafarers throughout the discussions.
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The Employers’ delegates,

though quite active in the drafting committee, did not take part in the discussions and
seem to have had no opposition against the convention. However, Government
delegates had a challenging debate.
The first important point in discussions is the opinion of the USA Government
delegate. This delegate was against articles 5 and 6 (giving shore leave) and this is
quoted as a clear “No” on behalf of the US government. Another point is the debate
between the Government delegates of India and Pakistan about the special situations
of their seafarers and the two-sided problems they have in this respect. Yet it is an
important issue, as it shows how bilateral circumstance can discourage global
agreements. So far, neither of the two has ratified the C108 convention.
On the other hand, the Government delegate of India believed that western and
European seafarers needed shore leave, but the major concern was that some
seafarers would abuse this opportunity. This delegate claimed that if European
seafarers were granted shore leave easily, they would settle in Indian ports and take
jobs that belonged to their nationals in Indian ports. Some delegates were also
concerned about complications arising from issuing cards for non-nationals.
Considering all the above discussions, the convention was formally adopted with 105
votes for, 6 against and 15 abstentions on May 13 1958. At the time of the adoption,
there were 24 Government members, 8 Employers members and 8 Workers
members. To achieve equality of voting, each Government member had one vote
and each Employers’ member and each Workers’ member had three votes; the reason
why the number of votes is larger than the number of delegates.

2.2.2. ILO C108 convention
The ILO C108 convention, which was the first convention about identification of
seafarers, was an effort to harmonize seafarers’ ID documents, aiming at the
recognition by each State of SIDs issued by other States, for the purpose of
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facilitating shore leave and professional movement. In other words, they had to
recognize seafarers’ SIDs to let them go ashore or move to/from their vessels instead
of using passports and visas.
The convention entered into force in 1961 and gradually got a wide acceptance rate.
With 105 positive votes at the International Labour Conference at the time of the
adoption, 62 States have ratified the C108 convention so far (30 August 2004.)
According to this convention, States are obliged to issue a SID for their nationals
upon request. Nevertheless, they are not prohibited from issuing SIDs for nonnational crew onboard their ships.
The convention considers simplicity of design and use of durable materials for the
document as necessary and then defines the necessary information to be included in
the document. However, the precise form and contents of the document are left to be
decided by individual States.
Shore leave
In article 6 of the C108 convention, the important issue of shore leave is raised. This
article obliges ratifying States to give permission to seafarers to go ashore while their
ship is in a port of that State, without holding a visa. It also requires each ratifying
State to let seafarers from other States enter their territory without a visa for the
purpose of professional movement, which is defined as three different instances: to
join their ship, to pass in transit to join their ship in another territory, or for any other
purpose approved by State authorities. These are explained by using the words
“Shall permit”, which shows the intention to put a strong obligation on States in this
respect.
Entry into force of the C108 convention is explained as being 12 months after two
ratifications registered with the ILO Director-General, which was 19/2/1961.
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2.2.3. IMO FAL convention
To emphasize the right of seafarers to use shore leave, IMO also addressed the issue
in its Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL) 1965,
which entered into force on 5 March 1967.

The main objectives of the FAL

convention are to prevent unnecessary delays in maritime traffic and improve
cooperation among States. Nevertheless, in section G, standard 3.44 clearly obliges
the public authorities of member States to allow foreign crew members ashore while
the ship is in port, provided that they have no reason to refuse permission due to
reasons of public order, health or safety. To further emphasize the issue, the next
standard 3.45 States: “Crew members shall not be required to hold a visa for the
purpose of shore leave.”
Actually, IMO has tried to underline the importance of shore leave for seafarers In
this widely accepted convention (98 ratifications so far.)

2.3. Seafarers’ qualifications
On the other hand, seafarers should receive enough training and experience for each
position they occupy onboard. So, besides the identity document, each seafarer
should have valid documents called Certificates of Competence (CoC) to prove the
qualifications they have obtained. Today, CoC is an integral element of professional
jobs onboard ships, and it is by having a valid CoC that a seafarer can be qualified as
a crewmember.
IMO addressed the issue of minimum standards of competence for seafarers in its
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers (STCW) in 1978, as amended in 1995 (hereinafter called the STCW
convention.) The STCW convention has certain procedures to be followed by the
member States to ensure the training and competence of seafarers. The fact that
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training and certification of seafarers is one of the main pillars of the IMO can reveal
the level of importance of the issue for the whole industry.
While some non-maritime entities may be responsible for the SID, maritime
administrations are the ultimate body in charge of the CoC. The argument about
SIDs is that immigration authorities of the seafarers’ State of nationality are the most
competent entity to issue them.

2.4. Current practice
Although the C108 convention is in place to set a standard for SIDs, the format of the
SID still depends a lot on the issuing State. This is also true of CoCs, which are
issued by the maritime administrations in Flag States. Thus, States issue documents
for their seafarers in a way that best suits their requirements, while those who have
ratified the conventions also try to comply with the rules set by the relevant
conventions.
Currently, seafarers carry the SIDs issued by Nation States. Regarding shore leave,
different States have various practices in place; some follow the regulations of the
C108 convention, some give seafarers even more freedom by relying on crew lists
and some require individual visas. For example, as the United Kingdom is a member
of the ILO C108 convention, foreign seafarers calling at a UK port enjoy all the
rights conferred by the convention, including the visa exemption for shore leave and
professional movement. Thus, seafarers that have a valid identity document in hand
(even if they are not a national of the issuing country) can go ashore in UK ports if
their names are listed in the crew list. However, this is valid only for seafarers who
obtain their identity documents from a ratifying State of the C108 convention. (The
UK Immigration & Nationality Directorate website, 2004)

In the Netherlands,

foreign seafarers on the crew list are allowed to land for shore leave without any
documentation. There is also no requirement to produce a passport or a seaman’s
book or to be in possession of a shore pass. Seafarers on shore leave are completely
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free to move within the city limits where the port was located and in neighbouring
cities. (International Labour Organization, 2003a, p. 14)
In the Philippines, crew list visas are used. A crew list visa is a seaman visa issued
for all foreign members of the crew of a vessel approaching a country. In the
Philippines, a crew list visa is valid for single entry only. (The Philippine Embassy in
Stockholm website, 2004) Although the use of crew list visas has been the normal
practice in the USA, the situation has changed now, meaning that all such seamen
would have to apply for a normal visa to go ashore in US ports. (“US insists that
crew list visas must end”, 2004, p. 1)
On the other hand, CoCs are issued by the maritime administrations for the seafarers
who join one of their vessels. The certificate can be issued based on a training
course pursued by the seafarers or it can be an endorsement of a certificate already
issued by another State. The rules and regulations governing these certificates are set
in the IMO’s STCW convention. As this is a widely ratified convention, with 147
ratifications so far, most of the countries follow its procedures and many States issue
endorsements based on the certificates issued by other member States. However,
there are certain problems in the system such as fraudulent practices, which shall be
covered in the next section.
Meanwhile, there are also some trial plans to combine the two, such as what Liberia
is doing now. This is a test project that tries to employ a single document for both
identity and certificates. This, as will be seen, is considered to be the solution to
many problems currently experienced in the identification and certification of
seafarers.

2.5. Problems and implications
As the importance of documents and certificates increases, fraud and forgery also
escalate. Fraud is a significant problem in the shipping world, especially where most
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of the crews come from developing countries. Sometimes, it is really hard to prevent
it from happening, as the people involved have rarely any other choice. For example,
a person who has problems in earning a living for his family may do anything to get
a job, and if he does not have enough qualifications, he may gladly pay for a forged
document or certificate of competency.

2.5.1. Fraudulent practices
The problem of fraudulent certificates has been stressed and focused upon by IMO,
after commissioning a study in this respect, done by the Seafarers’ International
Research Centre (SIRC) in 2001. The study shows that there has been evidence of
fraud in the CoC or other documents in all visited countries. The research paper
categorizes fraud in two major classes: fraud in the certification process and forgery
of the certificate itself. The former results in an incompetent person obtaining a
genuine certificate, while the latter result in a forged certificate being produced and
used by a seafarer.
Obviously, to solve this problem, both sources of fraud should be combated. This
means besides strengthening the documents against forgery, there should be a set of
well-developed administrative measures in place to prevent unscrupulous employees
from fraudulently issuing genuine certificates to incompetent persons. Nevertheless,
relevant authorities can make forgery impossible or very hard to achieve by
strengthening the documents.
This applies to any important document, including SID and CoC. By choosing
secure and hard to forge documents, the issuers can assure immigration authorities in
other States of the true identity of the seafarers, as well as the credibility of their
documents, thus giving seafarers more chance to get their rights, including shore
leave.
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2.5.2. Security
As mentioned above, in large societies, one needs to prove one’s identity by
presenting valid documents. This becomes a vital necessity in circumstances where
security is a major concern. Nowadays, it is quite common to doubt anything on a
vessel if a seafarer does not present the necessary SID or CoC documents on request.
While other modes of transport are already considered to be unsafe due to security
threats, the shipping industry is also under close scrutiny by the security authorities.
So, the credibility of SIDs and CoCs is essential for all relevant authorities, such as
Port State Control, Flag State inspectors, shipowners, etc., to prove that a vessel is
being run by a competent crew who can safely and securely perform their tasks.
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Chapter 3
The change
As described in the last chapter, the importance of identification and certification of
seafarers in the shipping business is to be seen in conjunction with specific problems.
So, it is expected that the responsible entities come up with solutions to the
problems. To this end, IMO and ILO are the ultimate accountable entities, where
IMO is more focused on the certification of seafarers and ILO interested in seafarers’
identification. In fact, IMO has a major concern about fraudulent practices in the
certification of seafarers. On the other hand, with its unique position in labour
related issues, ILO has a special focus on seafarers’ affairs. Although ILO had
already adopted a convention for seafarers’ identification in 1958 (the C108
convention), yet they decided needed to come up with an update, to solve the shore
leave and other security related problems for seafarers. Thus, IMO and ILO initiated
the change.

3.1. The driving forces of change
Problems in the identification and certification of seafarers are important driving
forces of change. However, existence of problems is not the only factor that has
necessitated the change in this field by IMO and ILO; in effect, several other causes
have accelerated the change, which shall be covered here.
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3.1.1. SIRC report
After receiving reports about the observed fraudulent practices in documents related
to seafarers by its secretariat, IMO decided to have research done to identify the
dimension of the problem. The outcome of the research, which was done by the
Seafarers’ International Research Centre (SIRC), caused a great impact and gave the
States a good incentive to change the current system of issuing SIDs and CoCs.
The SIRC report clearly shows that fraud is a major problem in the shipping industry.
It says: “Evidence of fraudulent practices was found in respect of all certificates
issued in accordance with chapters I to VI of the STCW-95 convention” and “A
survey of seafarers (n=1,105) from six of the largest labour supply countries …
found nine per cent of respondents reporting direct or indirect experience of
fraudulent certificates.” The report also suggests that “The existing format and
security measures of certificates of competency and other documents issued in
accordance with STCW-95 Convention are inadequate.” (Seafarers International
Research Centre, 2001, pp. 2, 3, 4)
Therefore, something had to be done to solve these problems.

3.1.2. September 11
The incident of September 11 in the United States affected virtually everything in the
world. The most important upshot for seafarers was a much more stringent policy
regarding shore leave. After the incident, officials in the USA decided to demand
visas for seafarers (of nationalities which need a visa to enter the US) to go ashore.
This actually meant “no more shore leave in the US ports” because it was virtually
impossible for seafarers to go to a consul and request a visa for each voyage to the
USA, while they rarely have a fixed and predefined itinerary. This caused major
problems for seafarers, as it is vital for them to go ashore after staying and working
in the confined area of the ship for a long time.
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9/11 caused a major change in the shipping world, regarding security. In harmony
with many consequent security measures after September 2001, the new security
instrument called the ISPS Code, which is one of the fastest instruments ever
developed by IMO, entered into force to try to raise the security level onboard
vessels and in port facilities. One of the issues addressed by the code, which is
relevant to this dissertation, is a supplementary measure introduced in conference
resolution 8 (dated 12 Dec. 2002), inviting ILO to continue the development of a SID
instrument as a matter of urgency. (International Maritime Organization, 2003, pp.
134-135)
On the other hand, the US congress directed the US maritime administration to
negotiate an international agreement “that provides for a uniform, comprehensive,
international system of identification for seafarers” in a measure signed into law (PL
107-295) on November 25, 2002. This finally led to the adoption of the ILO C185
convention (International Labour Organization, 2004).
Moreover, after such an incident, everyone thought something should be done, even
if the acquired measures were not pervasive and convincing. Thus, something was to
be done to rectify security threats in all transport sectors, including shipping. As
identity forgery is one of the most primitive issues relating to terrorism and many
other unlawful acts, seafarers’ identification was a good topic to focus upon.

3.1.3. Technology
Another powerful driver for change is the availability of new technology in IT and
biometrics. Today, the use of computers and peripherals makes it possible to create
more secure documents. Besides, while biometrics has long been used manually, the
recent integration of IT and biometrics gives us the possibility to authenticate people
by using machines.
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“IT” is a very dynamic technology. It has been improving at a surprising rate, which
is second to nothing in the whole world. Day after day, innovations introduce new
ways of doing things and open new horizons in this technology. This trend causes
the price of IT equipment to fall over very short periods. Talking about integrated
IT/biometrics applications, factors such as advancements in IT, availability of
information about it and continuous price reductions have made it feasible to think
about a solution of this kind for the identification and certification of seafarers.
On the other hand, the application of biometrics and IT in other sectors such as
aviation has encouraged the shipping industry to contemplate the use of these
technologies.

Aviation has already started to use biometrics to automatically

authenticate its workers, and it seems to have been successful. Although the two
sectors are not identical, they have many similarities and thus, the successful
application of this technology in aviation has led to the perception that it could also
be successful in the shipping business.

3.1.4. Political situations
Various political situations in the world have also contributed to necessitating the
change. Even though it has rather a unilateral approach in dealing with certain issues,
the USA plays a major role in world politics. As an example, one could refer to the
consequences of the 9/11 in the world, where an incident inside US territory and in
another sector, i.e. aviation, led to widespread changes in the transport industry,
including the inclusion of biometrics in visas and passports and the adoption of a
new security instrument by IMO (the ISPS Code) which has now entered into force.
In fact, there has been a strong influence by the USA over the international
community during the past couple of years, to enhance security measures in different
fields, including the shipping industry. One of the measures in this sector is to
improve the identification and certification documents for seafarers.
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On the other hand, despite their active role in the industry, many developing States
have little say in the international fora. This leaves the international community
unaware of their requirements and desires, and also opens the way for States such as
the USA to influence the others and lead the whole community in a certain direction.
In these situations, the need for change felt by some States could easily be developed
as an international necessity. This is also true of changes in seafarers’ identification
documents. In addition, the importance given to this issue by the G8 summit in
Kananaskis and Evian supported the change even more. (Doumbia-Henry, 2003, p.
133)

3.2. The change
Having considered the needs for change, it is time to focus on the change itself,
which was initiated by two major players; IMO and ILO. However, these two have
acted in different ways.
IMO, being aware of, and very much concerned about the problem of fraudulent
practices in the certification of seafarers, suddenly encountered the more important
issue of security, which was given priority over all the other activities of IMO. As a
result, it decided to transfer the job to ILO to find a solution for seafarers’
documents.
On the other hand, ILO has had its own concerns regarding the refusal of shore leave
and the professional movement of seafarers, which had deteriorated after 9/11. So, it
decided to amend the C108 convention about seafarers’ identification documents, but
ILO did this in its own way; i.e., although IMO had favoured the inclusion of CoC,
this never happened in the solution coming out of ILO, mainly because of the time
factor.
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3.2.1. IMO strategy
While IMO mostly has relied on the outcome of the ILO discussions, it has also tried
some other measures to prevent or combat fraudulent practices in seafarers’
certification. The STCW subcommittee at its 33rd session suggested parties follow
the format of certificates in section A-1/2 and guidelines in section B-1/2 of the
STCW code for the issuance of certificates. It also urged parties to design certificates
so that they are expensive to forge.
The IMO website is also equipped with a certificate verification facility, which is a
useful tool for the exchange of information about certificates among States. Besides,
MSC has produced several guidelines on anti-fraud measures, such as
MSC/Circ.1089 and MSC/Circ.1090 in June 2003, with the focus on prevention, as
well as the detection of unlawful practices regarding certificates.
The measures suggested by IMO are mostly related to the detection of forged
certificates, as well as some policies to be followed by administrations to avoid such
practices as much as possible. However, it should be borne in mind that these are
only suggestions, without any enforcement power. These measures include:
•

Development of IMO website to provide links to maritime administrations for
verification of certificates,

•

Development of a national database of issued certificates and giving access to
it for appropriate authorities such as PSC inspectors,

•

Guidelines on how to strengthen documents by adding security features such
as watermarks, use of special papers and inks, use of seals and laminates, etc.,

•

Strengthening procedures of issuance of certificates through checks and
audits, motivating employees, restriction of access to empty documents, etc.,

•

and other measures pursuant to recommendations in the SIRC report.
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3.2.2. ILO initiatives
In response to the request from IMO, the Governing Body of ILO, in its 283rd session
(March 2002) placed on the agenda of the 91st session of International Labour
Conference (held on June 2003) an urgent item to improve the security of seafarers’
identification. The Governing Body did this with a view to amend the C108
convention by a single discussion process, which is the procedure normally followed
by ILO to come up with a Protocol to a convention. However, the result of the work
done by ILO turned into the adoption of a new convention at the 2003 conference.
It took only 15 months from the time the item was included in the agenda to the
adoption of the new convention; C185. This is not a normal practice in ILO, as
conventions and recommendations are usually adopted through a double discussion
process.
Obviously, one of the reasons for this extraordinary procedure is the time pressure on
ILO to come up with the new document.

The other reason for changing the

amendment to a new convention was to enable the automatic denunciation of the
C108 convention for a member who has ratified it before the entry into force of the
new instrument, as it needed to be freed from some of its obligations before ratifying
the new convention.
On the other hand, ILO had long discussions, as well as a questionnaire, which is the
normal procedure at the ILO, to come up with amendments or new instruments to
achieve a common view of how to deal with the issue of seafarers’ certificates. One
of the items in that questionnaire was whether information about seafarers’
qualifications should (or could) be included in the document or not. This question
got 31 affirmative and 28 negative answers, but after all the discussions, ILO decided
to avoid inclusion of the information about certificates in the new document.
The main reasons for this were: inclusion of CoC data in the document would cause a
delay in the adoption of the instrument, would complicate the issue and would make
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it hard to implement. (International Labour Organization, 2003b, pp. 79-84) This
shows that under the time pressure and urgency of the issue, ILO has actually
compromised inclusion of CoCs.

3.3. ILO solution
Therefore, the outcome was a set of guidelines and recommendations for seafarers’
certificates from IMO, and a new convention for seafarers’ identification documents
(SID) from ILO. To understand this convention, a few important parts of it are
highlighted in this section.

3.3.1. The C185 convention
The C185 convention tries to introduce an international identity document for
seafarers, which would make SIDs more reliable, while maintaining seafarers’ rights.
Consistent with its tripartite structure, ILO undertook to make a balance between the
interests of governments, workers (seafarers) and employers (shipowners, crewing
agents, etc.) by enhancing security, facilitation of maritime commerce and movement
of ships and seafarers (professional movement) and the facilitation of shore leave to
avoid decent working and living conditions for seafarers.

3.3.1.1. Issuing State
The convention restricts ratifying States to issue SIDs only for seafarers who are
their nationals or permanent residents (article 2).

3.3.1.2. Format
The contents and format of the SID are defined in article 3 by giving a model, which
exclusively clarifies the particulars to be included. Some other general requirements
about material of the card, simplicity, validity period of maximum 5 years,

22

biometrics to be used, and visibility of information on the SID are also described
here.

3.3.1.3. Electronic Database
Similar to IMO’s suggestions for CoCs, ILO has also obliged States in its new
convention to maintain an electronic database to keep information of seafarers’
identity documents. This requirement is mentioned under article 4. Security of the
database, protection of seafarers’ privacy rights, allowing seafarers to see their
individual data fields in the electronic database, accessibility of the information for
competent authorities, designation of a permanent focal point to respond to inquiries
from the immigration authorities of all member States for verification of the identity
documents, and exclusion of authorities from using the database for purposes other
than verification of seafarers’ identity are the measures considered by the convention
in this respect.

3.3.1.4. Quality control
The new convention has a separate article, as well as an annex (Annex III) on the
issue of quality control and evaluation of how the whole system works. Quality
control requires States to have secure procedures for handling blank and complete
identity documents, seafarers’ applications and the electronic database.
Article 5 also obliges each State to carry out an independent evaluation of its
issuance system, at least once every five years. The results of those evaluations
should be made available to all members. This is a significant way of sharing
knowledge and experience among States, because it lets all the States know how
other States are dealing with the issue and teaches them how to get away from
potential problems.
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3.3.1.5. Facilitation of shore leave, transit and transfer
Article 6 covers the main objectives of the convention. Here, all ratifying States are
obliged to give permission, in the shortest possible time, to seafarers who request to
enter the State’s territory in certain situations. These include: while a seafarer’s ship
is in port, if the seafarer wants to join a ship in that territory or transit the country to
get to another country where he can join his ship, or any other purpose approved by
the relevant authority of the member concerned. The last item leaves the issue open
to cover other probable situations as well. Nevertheless, this article does not prevent
States from refusing such permission when there are clear grounds for suspecting the
authenticity of a seafarer’s identity documents or on grounds of public order, health,
safety or security.

3.3.2. The chosen card and biometrics
In an innovative style, compared to the C108 convention, ILO decided to use
biometrics to bind the document to the seafarer. The application of biometrics is not
groundbreaking in the transport section, as ICAO has already started to use facial
recognition for its workers, but this is still a controversial issue. Notwithstanding all
the opposition, which blames biometrics for invading the privacy rights of human
beings, the C185 convention necessitates the use of fingerprints to identify seafarers.
Annex 1 of the C185 convention describes the model for seafarers’ identity
document.

Regarding the document itself, it is stated, “the materials used,

dimensions and placement of data shall conform to the ICAO specifications as
contained in Document 9303 Part 3 (2nd edition, 2002)….” This document describes
the specifications of different travel documents, such as Passports, Visas, and part 3,
which covers Official Travel Documents (Cards.) This section contains the technical
specifications common to all machine readable travel documents such as physical
requirements pertaining to deformation, toxicity, resistance to chemicals, temperature
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stability, humidity and light, and incorporates appropriate security safeguards to
protect against fraudulent use and forgery.
Further in the annex, there are some necessary security measures such as
watermarks, ultraviolet security, special inks, holograms, heat-sealed lamination, etc.
and then the data to be included is described in detail. In this same part, the
requirement for biometrics is mentioned as: “Biometric template based on a
fingerprint printed as numbers in a bar code conforming to a standard to be
developed.” This shows that the chosen biometrics is fingerprint and the chosen
method to store it on the document is barcode. As mentioned above, the standard
was not yet developed when the convention was adopted.

Therefore, the

International Labour Conference, following the C185 convention, adopted a
resolution in which the Governing Body was invited to request the Director-General
to take urgent measures for the development by the appropriate institutions of a
global interoperable standard for the biometric template adopted in the framework of
the convention. (International Labour Office, 2003, p. 2)
The result was a choice between two biometrics standards, which were different only
in the way the digital biometric information is extracted from the sample; one called
pattern-based and the other minutiae-based. As explained in section 4.1.4.1, there are
two methods to extract information from a fingerprint sample and make a machinereadable representation (called template) of it, viz. minutiae-based and pattern-based
techniques. When talking about the pattern-based method, determination of the
template by the geometrical patterns made by the ridges on the finger is meant,
whereas in minutiae-based technique, the template is determined by the number and
positions of the minutiae (breaks and points of bifurcation) that are found in those
ridges. (International Labour Office, 2004, p. 2)
Obviously, one of the two had to be chosen and the Governing Body of ILO finally
selected the latter (SID0002) as the standard to be used in its 289th session on 26th of
March 2004. (The International Labour Organization website, 2004)
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On the other hand, regarding the document itself, there was an examination of the
two available options throughout the discussions in the conference; a document with
an embedded processor (microchip) or Integrated Circuit (IC), i.e., a smart card, or a
simpler document without a chip, i.e. a normal card? The decision was finally made
to use the simpler document.
So, according to the standard chosen by ILO, two-finger minutiae-based biometric
templates of the seafarer to whom the document has been issued, shall be printed on
the document as numbers in a two dimensional bar code. The barcode has enough
capacity to store additional information such as personal identification data, issuer,
expiry date, and some other relevant information.

3.3.3. Ratification and entry into force
Like its ancestor, C108, the C185 convention requires two ratifying States for entry
into force. As described in article 12 of the convention, C185 will enter into force
“six months after the date on which the ratifications of two Members have been
registered with the Director-General.” This may seem a good way to have the
convention in force as soon as possible, but the requirement for only two ratifications
for entry into force of the convention is contentious. In effect, if the convention
enters into force with only a few ratifications, it could be seen as a bilateral or
multilateral agreement, rather than a widely accepted instrument. This suggests that
entry into force is not the definitive factor for a convention.
When talking about international law, it should be taken into account that there is no
international police, thus no one can enforce rules and regulations at the international
level. The law of the land is the supreme power in each territory, which implies that
only individual governments can enforce regulations inside their jurisdiction.
Therefore, to have a successful international regulation, the only way is to have as
many States accept and adopt the law in their national legislation as possible.
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Considering the above-mentioned situations, a successful convention is one with the
highest number of ratifications. However, some countries play a more important role
than others in the shipping industry, depending on the specific issue concerned. For
example, big Flag States have a crucial function in the registration of vessels, while
some Port States have a significant position in the shipping business. To have a
successful convention, the role of these States should also be considered. This
suggests that both number of ratifying States and their positions in the business are
significant.
Thus, the C185 convention could be a successful instrument if more States ratified it,
but the success would be guaranteed if the ratifying countries include major States,
such as the USA, which has a considerable position in the issue of identification of
seafarers, as well as security in the shipping industry.

3.3.4. Evaluation
Even though the C185 convention is a good step forward, it does not seem to have
been successful so far. Now, after 15 months from the consensus-based adoption of
the convention, only three ratifications are registered; by France, Jordan and Nigeria.
This signals a problem; otherwise, the States whose representatives agreed upon the
convention would not fail to ratify it.
One of the major problems with the C185 convention seems to be the position
acquired by the USA. The US State department has formally eliminated crew list
visas since July 2004, reiterating “its objections to the ILO’s seafarers’ identity card
as a potential substitute for the individual entry visas now required of mariners
calling at US ports.” (McLaughlin, 2004.) This means that seafarers who want to
take leave ashore must request a visa and obtain one through the consular process
before their travel to the USA. On the other hand, the banning of the ILO C185
convention by the US State department and clear indications that the US will not
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ratify the convention, take away potential incentives of other States to ratify the
convention.
The US State Department justifies its denial of the ILO proposed document by
reasoning: “it is likely to take years for such a document to be developed and adopted
widely” and insisting on the need to interview each visa applicant personally for
security purposes. (“US insists,” 2004, p. 1)

This makes a loop between two

interrelated problems against the success of the convention; States do not ratify the
convention or accept the new identity document as it is not globally accepted, and it
is not globally accepted because States do not ratify the convention or accept the new
document.
There are also certain aspects in the convention itself, which are potential obstacles.
For example, the convention obliges States to issue identity documents only for their
national seafarers. This would demand all States, even non-maritime ones to issue
maritime documents, which might not happen.
As a matter of fact, refusal of including certificate information in the document is a
major shortcoming of this convention. Without information regarding certificates of
the seafarer, the SID is merely another identity document. This is actually one of the
criticisms made by the US State department against the ILO C185 convention. Lack
of any link between seafarers’ identity and their qualifications has the potential of
making the SID non-credible; just consider a SID issued by a State for seafarers who
have all their certificates obtained from another State.

In this case, who is

responsible to ensure the person is really a seafarer? Even if seafarers’ certificates
were demanded by the issuing State, the next question would be: “Does the issuing
State have enough competence to check validity of those documents?”
The suggested database in the C185 convention also has some vague points. A clear
example is the requirement to avoid inclusion of seafarers’ date of birth in the
database. This can cause problems with respect to seafarers with common names.
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Chapter 4
Technology
To appreciate the situations regarding SIDs and CoCs and to evaluate the solution
proposed by ILO convention C185, one needs to understand the technology involved.
Talking about biometric identification solutions, one should deal with both
biometrics and card technology. On the one hand, biometrics gives us the possibility
to authenticate people using their biological or behavioural specifications. On the
other hand, the information needed for this purpose should be stored on a medium
that provides reliable access to the information.

In fact, card and biometrics

technologies complement each other and both need to be examined for the purpose of
this dissertation.

4.1. Biometrics
To start the discussion about the biometrics, there should be a clear definition of it.
Biometrics means the identification of an individual based of his or her distinguished
physical or behavioural characteristics. (Bolle, Connell, Pankanti, Ratha, & Senior,
2004, p. 3)

4.1.1. Background
The basic task to perform is authentication, which has long been used by human
beings, though in different ways. In this context, authentication means recognition of
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a genuine person to access a right. Actually, authentication is needed whenever a
person tries to use a service. The service can be a facility to attend, a resource to
gain access to or any other privilege to attain. For a long time, authentication of
people has been a requirement on certain occasions. For example, to pass a border or
to board an airplane, everyone should produce a document as proof of identity.
Documents have been, and still are widely being used for authentication. However,
application of the documents has had its problems.

In a document-based

authentication system, it seems to be easy to impersonate people by illegally
acquiring a document. On the other hand, forgery could happen by modifying the
information in the document. To prevent this, it was decided to add some other
information in the document, such as a picture of the holder of the document.
Security features such as watermarks and holograms were also added to documents
to prevent fraud. Yet they were not strong enough and fraudulent practices by
lawbreakers and criminals challenged the whole system through successful
impersonations and forgeries.
Application of secret knowledge such as passwords and phrases for authentication
was the next step, but this could not solve the problem either, since it was still
possible for crooks to unlawfully acquire the information and use them as a
successful disguise.
Then the industry decided to find a solution. The solution was an innovation, but its
application for ordinary authentication was quite new. Biometrics had already been
in place for negative authentication, i.e. to prevent known criminals from achieving
their goals by preventing them from using a service they were not eligible to use.
This is done by obtaining fingerprint samples from known criminals and keeping
them in a database. Later on, when someone tries to access an important service, his
or her biometric sample is compared with the database samples to see if there is any
correspondence. It is also possible to trace criminals whenever a crime happens; by
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comparing fingerprint samples obtained at the scene (called latent) with the database
samples.
However, in the new solution, biometrics is used for positive authentication, which
means to authenticate non-criminals to use the services they are eligible to use. Later
on, as this coincided with the evolution of IT and microelectronics, the solution has
turned out to be electronic biometrics.

4.1.2. Authentication methods
Authentication methods are based on three major modes: Possession, Knowledge and
Biometrics.

In possession-based authentication, identity is approved upon by

holding a key or document or any other physical proof of identity, which is
“something you have”. This method is used in systems which control access to
services using documents such as passports, ID cards, etc. The key can be shared,
lost, stolen or even duplicated in this method, which all oppose the security
requirements.
In knowledge-based authentication, a secret key or code or phrase, which is common
to the person and the authenticating entity is the key for successful authentication.
This is “something you know.” User IDs/passwords used in computer systems are of
this kind. The piece of knowledge used in this method can also be shared, or guessed
by an intruder or even forgotten.
However, when authentication is based on biometrics, the system deals with
“something you are”; i.e., a unique biological characteristic, which is permanently
bound to the individual person, such as a fingerprint or iris. Contrary to the other
methods, the biometric identifier cannot be shared, lost or stolen and is not easy to
forge.
In the above sequence of authentication methods, the level of security steps up by
moving from possession towards biometrics. To make authentication systems even
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stronger, it is possible to employ a combination of two or more modes. For example,
use of credit cards along with a PIN code, which is common in banking systems, is a
combination of possession and knowledge.

4.1.3. How biometric authentication works
Biometric authentication is a multi stage process. It is based on the comparison of a
live on-the-spot biometric sample of the person, with a previously obtained sample,
which is already stored in a database. Therefore, the first step is biometric enrolment,
in which the biometric sample of an individual is obtained and stored in a database.
This is normally done by scanning a biometric sample and converting it to a digital
format. Then the information representing the biometric sample, as well as the other
personal information of its owner is stored in a database.
The next step is to get a biometric sample of the person at the time of authentication.
The sample should then be digitized the same way as done at the enrolment stage, so
that a machine-based comparison could be done.
authentication stage, which gives us the result.

This comparison is the

The result of a machine-based

authentication process might not be a direct yes or no; it usually gives us a
probability of possible match between two (or more) biometric samples.

4.1.3.1. Identification vs. Verification
While authentication is the basic operation in both methods, identification and
verification are two different concepts.

Identification happens when a person

presents his or her biometrics and the system should figure out identity by comparing
this biometric sample with all the samples in the database. On the other hand, in a
verification process, the person claims an identity and then presents a biometric
sample to prove that claim. The system will then compare the presented biometric
sample with a corresponding sample of that same person in the database and approve
or reject the claimed identity. In fact, identification is a pure biometric measurement,
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while in verification, a unique identifier is used to distinguish the person before
dealing with biometrics.
The two methods also have some differences in their implementation, application
and quality.
Biometric identification
Identification is a more complicated process, because for each authentication, the
system should search the whole database to find a similar biometric sample. The
result of an identification process could be a multiple match, rather than a single one.
On the other hand, identification needs a centralized database of all biometric
samples, as the system needs to have access to all biometric samples to search and
find similar sample(s).

This means the authentication system should always

communicate with a central database.
There are two different categories of identification: positive and negative. Positive
identification means to find out if the person is enrolled in the system. This is
usually done to authorize people to access a service. Negative identification, on the
other hand, means to make sure the individual is not enrolled in the system. A
sample application of this method is to detect wanted criminals and prevent them
from accessing a service.
Biometric verification
This method simply involves the comparison of two biometric samples. The result of
a verification process is a probability of the two samples belonging to the same
person. In biometric verification, the need for a centralized database is not vital.
This suggests that besides a centralized database, the database could be spread over
individual documents. In other words, the enrolled biometric sample of each person
can be stored on his/her document to be used by the system whenever the person is
being authenticated.

This is a good option for situations where accessing a
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centralized database is not possible or economically feasible, e.g. onboard a vessel on
the high seas.

4.1.3.2. System Errors (FAR, FRR)
While the system is performing authentication, two errors may occur; false
acceptance of a person who is not enrolled in the system or false rejection of a
person who is genuinely enrolled in the system. The number of these incidents
compared to the total number of authentications is considered as a factor to measure
the accuracy of the system. There are two such factors: False Accept Rate (FAR)
and False Reject Rate (FRR.) In a system with the value of 1% for FAR, 1 person
out of every 100 may be falsely authenticated. Similarly, a system with a value of
10% FRR may falsely reject 10 out of every 100 persons being authenticated.
These two can be adjusted by setting some parameters in the software by the system
administrators. When higher levels of security are required, they usually set the
authentication systems in a more stringent mode to lower the probability of false
authentications. This can be interpreted as: the biometric matcher will compare the
samples more precisely and will reject the presented sample upon finding any
difference. Thus, such a system needs a lower FAR. However, as FAR and FRR are
two interrelated factors, setting the FAR at a lower level will result in a larger FRR.
This is because the extraordinary precision will cause genuine persons to be more
frequently rejected upon minor variations in their biometric samples.
In high security applications, FAR is usually more important than FRR. This may be
due to the different outcomes of each parameter; having a higher FAR means a
higher probability of authenticating intruders, which challenges the security of the
whole system. On the other hand, a higher FRR may need a repetition of the process
or interference of an operator to decide, which decreases the efficiency due to the
consequent delays. Therefore, in applications where big populations need to be
authenticated in a short time, like an airport, FRR is also significantly important.
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In effect, the FAR and FRR are chosen the result of a compromise between security
and convenience.

The higher the FAR, the more conveniently people are

authenticated, while security is, to some extent, sacrificed. On the other hand, the
higher the FRR, the more securely the system is working, for the price of a little
more inconvenience.

4.1.3.3. Biometric authentication system components
A basic biometric authentication system is composed of three major parts: Biometric
Reader, Biometrics Database and the Biometric Matcher.
The Biometric reader is the part that obtains a biometric sample of the person and
prepares it for use by the Matcher, and usually has two components: Biometric
Scanner and Feature extractor.

The Biometric Scanner is the actual interface

between the system and the person and scans biometric samples. Depending on the
type of biometrics, various devices can be used as biometric scanners, such as optical
scanners, photographic cameras, voice recorders, or video cameras.
To perform the comparison between biometric samples, the acquired samples need to
be converted into a suitable format. The reason is the existence of extra information
in a raw biometric sample, which will not be used in the authentication process, and
should be omitted from the information given to the Biometric Matcher. This is done
by the Feature extractor.

Therefore, only the features that are useful for the

authentication process are extracted from the sample and stored in digital format.
The Biometrics Database is a place where biometric samples obtained from the
individuals at the time of enrolment are stored.

Depending on the chosen

authentication method, this can be a centralized database or a decentralized one. For
biometric identification, the database should be centralized, as the system needs to
access all samples and find matching samples among them.

For biometric

verification, the database can be spread over all the issued documents. This is
because the live sample should be compared only with the enrolled sample for each
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person, which can be stored in his/her document. All these documents together will
then form a decentralized database.
The Biometric Matcher is the core of the system, as it performs the most important
part of the process, which is the comparison and all the calculations required to
accept or reject an individual. Having access to the biometric database and the live
biometric sample, this component can compare samples using its algorithms and
come up with the result, either a few probable matching samples (for identification)
or a single probability rate (in the case of verification.)

4.1.4. Biometric identifiers
There are several biometric features in the human body or behaviour that can be used
to identify people. To be used for biometric authentication, biometrics should have
certain specifications: (Bolle et al., 2004, pp. 5-6)
1. Universality: Everyone should have the biometric characteristic
2. Uniqueness: There should be no two persons with the same biometric
characteristic
3. Permanence: It should not vary over time
4. Collectability: It should be possible to measure the biometric characteristic by
obtaining a sample of it
Acceptability of employing the biometric identifier among people is also a
significant factor, although this varies depending on the time and place.
Biometric characteristics are of two major types: Physiological and Behavioural.
When dealing with physiological biometrics, the person does not need to do anything
but present the biometrics to a sensing device, such as putting a finger or hand on a
scanner or looking at a camera.

In behavioural biometrics, the person should

consciously do something, such as saying something or signing, etc.
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Among

different biometric identifiers, some are mature and used more widely than others,
which will be shortly described.

4.1.4.1. Fingerprint recognition
After touching a surface, traces of the fingers or fingerprints may remain on the
surface. This is because the skin in the inside surfaces of hands and feet contain
minute ridges and furrows between them. Human fingerprints have a feature that
makes it a good identifier for biometric authentication, which is uniqueness. There
are no two persons in the world, even identical twins, with the same fingerprints.
Therefore, it is possible to authenticate people based on their fingerprints.
The fingerprint has been used for a long time. There is proof that the Chinese were
aware of the uniqueness of fingerprints 5,000 years ago. (Bolle et al., 2004, p. 31)
Later, in the beginning of 20th century, law-enforcement bodies started to use
fingerprints for negative authentication of criminals. This was a manual process until
IT allowed electronic fingerprint authentication.
There are two approaches for matching fingerprint samples: image techniques and
feature techniques.

In image techniques, sample images are compared using

different optical correlation methods, while feature techniques extract certain
important features from the sample. The extracted features are then recorded in a
way to accurately represent the sensed biometric sample. Important features in a
fingerprint are ridge endings, bifurcations (where a ridge is divided in two), and
individual ridges. These features are also called minutiae (see Figure 1.)
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a:
b:
c:
d:

ridge ending
bifurcation
independent ridge
ambiguous ridge ending / bifurcation

Figure 1 – Fingerprint features
Source: Bolle, R. M., Connell, J. H., Pankanti, S., Ratha, N. K., & Senior, A. W. (2004). Guide to
biometrics. New York: Springer-Verlag

Considering a fingerprint sample in a two-dimensional XY chart, each feature can be
located using the X and Y-axes. The type and direction of the features can also be
recorded by using numeric codes. This method can result in a digital representation
of the sample.

As an example, the position and angle of the features in each

fingerprint sample can give a numeric representation that corresponds to the sample
(see Table 1.)

Table 1 – A minimal representation of fingerprint features
Θ
θ1
θ2
…

…

Y
y1
y2
…

X
x1
X2

Source: Bolle, R. M., et al. (2004). Guide to biometrics. New York: Springer-Verlag

There are different ways to scan fingerprint samples: Optical scan, Thermal scan,
Ultrasound and CMOS. The fingerprint is a mature biometric identifier with a
relatively low cost and good accuracy, but in practical terms, it suffers the negative
image of being used by law-enforcement bodies to authenticate criminals.

4.1.4.2. Facial recognition
Facial recognition is a familiar concept for human beings. It is common practice in
daily life to recognize people by looking at them and comparing their faces with the
reference picture already in mind. For more official applications, pictures are used as
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the reference for authentication, such as in passports and ID cards.

There are

different methods for scanning face images: single image (digitizing images), video
sequence, 3D image, near infrared (for poor lighting conditions), etc.
To perform the matching, face recognition systems use two methods: appearance and
face geometry. The first method reduces the amount of detail in the image and then
performs a comparison between the two samples. Face geometry, on the other hand,
extracts some features from the face image and then makes a numeric equivalent of it
by calculating their respective positions.
Common to both methods is that after capturing an image, the system should detect
the face in the image before it can proceed to other stages. Images can be captured
with or without knowledge of the person being authenticated. Cameras can be
placed at the check-in counters, or where people usually pay attention, such as a red
flashing light above a clock at the top of an escalator or on top of a metal detector at
the entrances. The best method is an image captured in tightly controlled conditions,
where distance and lighting are flexible and can be adjusted, as they should be.
Facial recognition is considered as an unobtrusive biometric identifier with relatively
low cost and moderate accuracy, but certain challenges stand facing it. Changes in
physical appearance of face while doing different activities or due to make-up,
wearing glasses or intentional disguise may cause problems. In addition, imaging
conditions such as lighting, distance, obliqueness of the object, etc. can prevent the
system from functioning correctly.

Compressed images using compression

techniques for faster data transmission may also lose some details that are vital for
matching facial samples.

4.1.4.3. Voice recognition
The voice human beings use is dependent on physical characteristics such as vocal
tract length, nasal tone, cadence and inflection. Nevertheless, voice is considered to
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be a behavioural biometric identifier, as it also changes due to the different practices
and situations of a person throughout life.
There are different methods for performing voice recognition: fixed text, where the
person reads a defined word or phrase already recorded at the time of enrolment,
text-dependent, in which a text phrase displayed by the system should be read, textindependent, where the system checks identity regardless of what is said, and
conversational, in which the system asks some questions and demands correct
answers from the right person. The last one seems to provide the highest level of
security, as both voice and knowledge of the person are being matched.
Voice is not distinctive enough to be used for identification, thus making it more
suitable for verification.

Nevertheless, it is a very good option for telephony

applications. Where remote authentication is needed, voice recognition can provide
a cheap solution over legacy devices, such as the ordinary telephone network. As a
sensing device for voice recognition, the microphone is the cheapest among all
biometrics.
However, voice recognition has certain vulnerabilities to “replay attacks”, variations
in the microphone and transmission channel, environment noise, and mismatch of
microphones used for enrolment and verification. Sickness, aging, emotional states
like stress and mistakes in reading the texts are also problems that may occur in the
process.

4.1.4.4. Iris scans
Another unique feature of human beings is the coloured part of the eye surrounded
by the sclera and pupil called iris. Iris scanning is an accurate, fast and stable
biometric identifier. The iris does not change or distort from sample to sample,
except the dilation of the pupil, which is also stable in similar illuminations.
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Iris recognition requires the cooperation of the person being authenticated, as the iris
should be at a predetermined distance from the camera. After capturing the image,
the centre of the pupil is found and then the area of the iris is considered as a matrix
of pixels. By giving a value to each pixel based on its phase, a code is generated for
each iris, which is then stored in a small memory space (only 256 bytes.)
As the code is not big, it is possible to perform a search in a big database to find a
similar code. Thus, iris scan recognition is suitable for identification. However, it is
still not mature and cheap enough to be commercially used, except for high security
applications.

4.1.4.5. Hand geometry
This method uses the geometric structure of hand and fingers such as length and
width of fingers, width and thickness of palm and aspect ratio of palm or fingers.
This is not a fully distinctive biometric identifier, and thus it has high values of FAR
and FRR. Nevertheless, it is a common identifier, mostly due to its simplicity, very
small sample size and the little computations required.
Hand geometry is mostly used for verification and rarely for identification purposes.
Although capturing the biometric sample in hand geometry requires effort and the
cooperation of the person being authenticated, it is a simple procedure; the palm
should be flatly placed on a panel with the fingers outstretched. Then the scanner
captures frontal and side images of the palm, which is then used to calculate the
required parameters (see Figure 2.)
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Figure 2– Hand geometry
Source: Bolle, R. M., et al. (2004). Guide to biometrics. New York: Springer-Verlag

Hand geometry is a good choice to combine with other biometrics such as
fingerprints. This combination makes the whole system stronger and more secure.

4.1.4.6. Signature verification
Signatures have long been in place. However, “the way people sign” is something
new to be used as a biometric identifier. Use of signature as a biometric identifier
has a good chance of being accepted by people, governments, law courts and other
legal entities, and commercial transactions. Yet, there are some disadvantages in it;
firstly that signatures are easy to forge and secondly, one’s signature might not
remain permanent, as people can change their signature, as often as everyday! This
is in contrast with one of the basic specifications of biometrics already mentioned,
i.e., Permanence.

Furthermore, frequent signatures of the same person are not

identical. They may deteriorate due to aging, health conditions, and environmental
factors.
The fact that people can choose their signatures also affects uniqueness of this
biometric identifier, as selection of the same or very similar signatures by two
persons is in opposition to uniqueness. Furthermore, the FAR and FRR parameters
can be affected, depending on how simple or complicated the chosen signatures are.
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To overcome these problems, On-line signatures can be used as opposed to the Offline signatures described above.

While off-line signatures are scanned from

signatures originally on paper, on-line signatures are created using electronic pens.
This is a device like a pen without ink, sensitive to movements and pressure on a
surface, and connected to a computer. Each movement of the pen on a surface is
accurately described by the information sent to the computer. So, if a person signs
using this pen, all the information related to the signature is captured.
Using on-line signatures and special pens, it is possible to measure the speed of
signing, delays in the process, pen force, number of vertical slope components,
number of interior contours, and even angle of the pen, which all together form a
good behavioural biometric identifier.

Contrary to off-line signatures, on-line

signatures seem to be hard to forge and also more stable, as they give priority to the
signing procedure over the signature itself. All these can make the signature a better
biometric identifier.
Nevertheless, sensing devices required for signature verification are special and
expensive, which is a major problem against the practical application of it.

4.1.4.7. Other biometric identifiers
There are several other emerging biometric identifiers under development. While
these identifiers still need time to be practically used, some of them can function very
well in combination with certain other identifiers.
•

DNA is a very accurate identifier. Every cell of the human body can be used to
obtain a DNA sample. Then a code is generated from the sample, which can be
used to identify the person. This method is now used in forensic applications
mostly for the identification of criminals.

One major disadvantage is that

identical twins have the same DNA structure. DNA identification is also a slow
and expensive process, and considered to invade privacy, as a DNA sample can
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provide many other biological specifications of the person, which can be used for
unforeseen purposes if revealed to inappropriate authorities.
•

Retina scan uses the shape of blood vessels in the back of the eye (choroidal
vasculature.) This is considered to be the most secure biometric identifier, as
besides uniqueness, it is permanent and unaffected by anything, actually
impossible to change or duplicate, and very accurate. To produce the biometric
sample, the person needs to look into an eyepiece and focus on a specific light
spot for a few seconds, which is not easy and comfortable for many people. On
the other hand, the required contact with the eyepiece can be contrary to personal
hygiene.

•

Thermograms use the pattern of heat radiated by the human body. To make a
biometric identifier using this technique, images of parts of the body are captured
using infrared wavelengths. Some of the more common thermogram biometric
identifiers are facial thermogram, hand thermogram, and hand vein thermogram.
The advantage of thermograms over visual scans is their independence on
illumination; an infrared image can be captured in complete darkness. On the
other hand, in facial thermogram recognition, the results are not subject to
changes of the face due to facial hair growth, make-up or other skin level
changes. As the infrared wavelength captures the features under the skin, it is
nearly impossible to forge or change thermogram identifiers. A disadvantage is
the high expense of sensors, which make it impractical. Thermogram biometrics
can also be used for covert recognition.

•

Gait, which is the way people walk, is a behavioural biometric identifier.
Although gait is not distinctive, it is useful for low security systems where
recognition of people at a distance on video is required. Gait recognition systems
use video cameras to capture people while walking and make many computations
to measure movements. It should be considered that gait might not stay invariant
over time. Such a system is susceptible to the ground surface, viewpoint of the
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camera, objects being carried by the person, shifts in body weight and health
condition, and clothing of the person being tracked.
•

Keystroke recognition has to do with each person’s special typing capabilities.
Calculating times between keystrokes and the hold time of each stroke will
provide an identifier that could be used for identification, though it is not really
individual. As the capture is done while the person is typing some text, keystroke
recognition is considered as an unobtrusive method. The system can be textdependent (fixed message or password) or text-independent (different text each
time.) One of the practical concerns regarding this identifier is that some people
do not use computers and do not know how to type, thus making the system
ineffective for them.

•

Ear recognition is based on the uniqueness of the shape of the ear and the
structure of the cartilaginous tissue of the pinna, although it is not proved to be
distinctive. The matching approach uses distances of salient points of the pinna
from a landmark location on the ear. Ear recognition usually works well in
combination with other biometric identifiers such as facial recognition, where
both samples can be captured simultaneously.

•

Lip motion is a behavioural biometric identifier. It is based on the motions of
lips while the person is speaking. Thus the capture phase is done using a video
camera. Obviously, the first task for the system is to find lips in the image. The
drawback, thus, is the requirement for good illumination, as the system would be
unable to recognize lips in the image in poor lighting.

There are different

methods for matching, which can be text-dependent or text-independent. Lip
motion recognition is considered as the visual equivalent of voice recognition.
To give the best results, lip motion can be combined with voice recognition or
facial recognition techniques.
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•

Skin reflection is a new method. Using near-infrared light, it is possible to
measure the reflection from skin. This can be used as a standalone biometric
identifier, but an interesting application is to combine it with fingerprint sensors,
to prevent forgery in fingerprint recognition.

•

Body odour is different in different persons. Use of dogs to track people shows
that it is possible to use odour as a biometric identifier. In practice, when a whiff
of the air surrounding the person is sprayed over a spectrum of chemical sensors,
each of which is sensitive to certain compounds, the chemical structure of the
body odour is captured. Nevertheless, there are obstacles in practical application
of this identifier, as body odour varies due to the use of deodorants, perfumes and
soaps. Diets and health conditions also affect body odour.

While some of the above mentioned identifiers are good options for application in
biometrics, most of them are not mature enough, and thus expensive and uncertain to
be actually used. However, future improvements in the biometrics or advancements
in other related technologies may make some of them good choices. Nonetheless,
scientific research continues to devise new biometric identifiers suitable for
identification.

4.1.5. Comparison
4.1.5.1. Biometric features
Biometric identifiers are different in terms of accuracy. As already mentioned, some
of them may be more accurate in certain applications, while others might function
less precisely. However, accuracy is only one of the many factors that should be
considered for a proper comparison among biometric identifiers. These factors
include cost, error rate, speed, acquirability, privacy and ease of use.
Table 2 shows a comparison between the six most common biometric identifiers.
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Table 2 – Comparison of the attributes of the six popular biometric identifiers

Finger

Face

Voice

Iris

Hand

Signature

Maturity

very high

medium

medium

medium

high

medium

Sensor type

contact

non
obtrusive

non
obtrusive

non
obtrusive

contact

contact

Sensor size

small

small

very small

medium

large

Medium

Sensor cost

< $200

< $50

< $5

< $300

< $500

< $300

Template size
(byte)

< 500

< 1,000

< 2,000

256

< 100

200

Scalability

high +

medium

low

very high

low

high -

Source: Bolle, R. M., et al. (2004). Guide to biometrics. New York: Springer-Verlag

Maturity plays an important role. A mature biometric identifier is based on a wellstudied science and enough technological development.

The application of a

biometric identifier for a long time lets the industry recognize more aspects of it and
find solutions for any potential problems that may occur as time goes by, including
human behaviour in response to the biometrics. Thus, a more mature biometric
identifier is preferable for practical application. The fingerprint has the highest level
of maturity among all biometrics, due to its long history.
The biometric sensor is an important part of each biometric identification system,
which can affect the whole process and should be considered carefully. Sensor type
can be contact or non-contact. Contact sensors require the cooperation of people and
thus are potentially obtrusive, while non-contact sensors are more suitable for
populations that are more sensitive to privacy issues. These sensors are also used in
covert identification and surveillance systems.
Sensor size is another varying factor among different identifiers.

While some

sensors like a microphone for voice recognition are very small, others are bigger, like
the sensors used for hand geometry.

Sensor cost is also a significant factor,
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especially for non-mature biometric identifiers. However, importance of this factor
changes as technology improvements cut the costs.
A biometric template is the digital representation of a biometric sample. In other
words, it is the outcome of a feature extractor, which is stored in digital format. The
size of a biometric template does not correspond to accuracy; a bigger template does
not mean a more accurate biometric identifier. However, it is a significant factor in
the implementation of biometrics, especially in systems that use distributed databases
on cards. This is because cards have a limited capacity and can keep only certain
amounts of information. As Table 2 shows, the template size of biometrics varies
from very small for hand geometry to very big for voice recognition. Template size
also affects the comparison methods and hence, speed of the system in checking
samples with each other. For this reason, biometric identifiers with big templates are
not suitable for identification, as it takes a long time to compare the sensed sample
with all the samples in the database.
Scalability addresses the capability of the biometric identifier to be employed in
larger populations, without getting high false acceptance rates. This depends on the
distinctiveness of the biometric identifier, which helps the system authenticate people
in large societies. Generally, as population grows, the number of errors in the system
goes up. If this number becomes very big, the identifier is not scalable. Biometric
identifiers with low scalability also cause problems in the enrolment process, due to
the requirement for handling exceptions.

Contrary to the pros of using highly

scalable biometric identifiers is their weak acceptability due to privacy issues,
because more distinctive identifiers are usually more obtrusive as well. Among the
six identifiers described, the iris has the highest level of scalability.

4.1.5.2. Application properties
On the other hand, it is not possible to come up with a universal biometric solution
for all applications; properties of the application for which the biometrics is to be
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used should also be considered. A good biometric identifier for one application may
be very bad for another application. This is due to the different requirements and
conditions of each application compared to the others.
Selection of a suitable biometric identifier for a system depends on many factors
including population, cultural issues, acceptability of the biometrics, necessity to use
distributed databases, available data communications, time factors and costing
conditions. All these factors affect the importance of features of the biometric
identifier for the specific application.
Table 3 shows the weighting of some features and drawbacks of biometrics in three
sample applications: physical access, credit cards, and airport access, which belong
to the transport sector. On the left hand side, the potential drawbacks and features of
using a biometric identifier are named and in the right hand columns, the weighting
of those features for the three sample applications are given. For example, the
drawback of requiring cooperation in airport access is higher than that of the others.
The reason behind this is that in physical access, the person needs to be
authenticated, while in airport access, people get a service for which they have paid
and thus, looking at the authentication as an obligatory inconvenience for
themselves. For this reason, it is not easy to ask people to cooperate with this system
in airport access systems.
Population missing is another factor, which happens when people leave the system
due to the inconvenience of employing biometrics. This is not a big problem for
physical access, as the population is limited to a group of people who have enough
incentive to use the system and must interact with it in the proper way. Quite the
opposite, airport access or credit card systems are vulnerable to this problem, as
people may easily avoid using the service and try other choices.
Among sampling properties, acquisition time is very important for airport access and
physical access, as in these systems, due to the large number of users, any delay can
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cause major problems. This is not the case for credit cards, as time usually is not as
crucial in using them.

Table 3 – Important weightings for some applications

Importance weighting
Intrinsic properties
Required cooperation
Social stigma
Intrusiveness
Population missing
Sampling properties
Inconvenience
Required proximity
Acquisition time
Failure to enroll
Failure to acquire
1:1 matching properties
# FA per 10K (when FRR = 10%)
# FA per 10K (when FRR = 1%)
Template size (bytes)
Technology properties
Installation cost
Continual cost
Cost per match

Physical access

Credit card

Airport access

low
medium
medium
low

low
high
high
medium

high
medium
medium
medium

medium
low
high
medium
medium

high
medium
medium
High
High

medium
high
high
medium
high

medium
medium
low

High
medium
High

high
high
medium

medium
medium
low

High
High
medium

medium
medium
medium

Source: Derived from Bolle, R. M., et al. (2004). Guide to biometrics. New York: Springer-Verlag

Table 3 shows accuracy by using the number of False Accepts in two situations,
depending on the value set for FRR in the system. This is only valid for verification
systems, which are based on a 1 to 1 comparison of the sensed and the database
samples. The first row addresses systems that are more focused on rejecting fake
people, which is suitable for high security situations. In other words, the system is
working more precisely or at a higher security level. The second row refers to
systems set to accept genuine people, which is the case when the system is set to
work in more secure environments. This is usually done when the system faces few
security challenges.
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The weighting considers the number of genuine people rejected in the abovementioned situations. When the system is focused on rejecting fake people, the
number of False Accepts is vital for high security applications such as airport access,
as the risk factor is very big, but it has a moderate importance for credit cards and
physical access systems, as the amount of damage is usually limited if a False Accept
happens (a few hundred dollars in credit cards.) When the system is more willing to
accept genuine people, the number of False Accepts is still important for airport
access and credit card systems, as they use this setting for normal conditions, where
large number of False Accepts would cause security problems.
As it can be seen, template size has a high significance for credit cards, as the
template should be stored on a limited storage, i.e. the card memory. The last section
of Table 3 shows that cost is not a matter of real concern for physical and airport
access, compared to the high value of the assets in the application, or the levels of
security that justify high costs.

4.1.5.3. Mismatch calculation
One of the methods used to evaluate biometric identifiers for different applications is
mismatch calculation. This is done by calculating a number that shows how much
the biometric features disagree with the application requirements; in other words,
how much the drawbacks upset the application. Calculation of this number needs a
comparative evaluation of drawbacks in different biometric technologies. Table 4
shows these values.
The values in Table 4 are mostly descriptive, which cannot be used in a numeric
procedure, such as the calculation of a mismatch score. Thus, they need to be
converted into numeric values. On the other hand, there should be a relationship
between the importance of biometric features in an application (Table 3) and the
drawbacks of a biometric identifier (Table 4.) For this purpose, the values of “1”,
“3”, and “10” are assigned to “low”, “medium” and “high” respectively. For “1:1
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matching properties”, the numbers are calculated using the following formulae,
considering v as the number in Table 4 and C as the resultant value:
#FA per 10K (FRR=10%):

C = max ( 0 , 10 * log10 v + 10)

#FA per 10K (FRR = 1%):

C = max ( 0 , 10 * log10 v )

Template size:

C = v / 100

Table 4 – Approximate values for drawbacks of various biometrics in general (not application
specific)

Drawbacks

Signa-

Finger

Face

Voice

Iris

Hand

Required cooperation

high

low

low

medium

high

Social stigma

high

low

low

medium medium

low

Intrusiveness

medium

low

low

medium medium

low

low

low

medium

Inconvenience

low

low

Required proximity

high

low

Acquisition time

low

low

medium medium medium

Failure to enroll

medium

low

medium

Failure to acquire

medium medium medium medium

ture

Intrinsic properties

Population missing

low

high

medium

medium

low

medium medium

medium

low

medium

Sampling properties

high

high

high
medium

low

low

low

low

1:1 matching properties
#FA per 10K (FRR=10%)

0.1

10

300

0.001

10

300

#FA per 10K (FRR = 1%)

10

1,000

1,000

0.1

100

1,000

Template size (bytes)

500

1,000

2,000

250

100

200

Installation cost

low

low

low

medium medium

Continual cost

low

low

low

medium

low

low

Cost per match

medium

low

low

low

medium

Low

Technology properties

Source: Bolle, R. M., et al. (2004). Guide to biometrics. New York: Springer-Verlag
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medium

Then two columns are lined up for one application and one biometric identifier and
the mismatch scores for each feature are calculated by multiplying the two values. As
an example, Table 5 shows how this method works for “physical access” and
“fingerprint”.

Table 5 – Computing a mismatch score by assigning numeric values and summing. W = weight,
P = penalty and X denoted product (W x P).

Importance weighting

Physical access

W

X

P

Finger

Low

→

1

10

10

←

high

Social stigma

medium

→

3

30

10

←

high

Intrusiveness

medium

→

3

9

3

←

medium

low

→

1

1

1

←

low

medium

→

3

3

1

←

low

Required proximity

low

→

1

10

10

←

high

Acquisition time

high

→

10

10

1

←

low

Failure to enroll

medium

→

3

9

3

←

medium

Failure to acquire

medium

→

3

9

3

←

medium

# FA per 10K (FRR = 10%)

medium

→

3

0

0

←

0.1

# FA per 10K (FRR = 1%)

medium

→

3

30

10

←

10

low

→

1

5

5

←

500

Installation cost

medium

→

3

3

1

←

low

Continual cost

medium

→

3

3

1

←

low

Cost per match

low

→

1

3

3

←

medium

Intrinsic properties
Required cooperation

Population missing
Sampling properties
Inconvenience

1:1 matching properties

Template size (bytes)
Technology properties

SUM

135

Source: Bolle, R. M., et al. (2004). Guide to biometrics. New York: Springer-Verlag

As can be seen, the final result is a number that shows the amount of mismatch
between the biometric identifier and the application. Obviously, the smaller this
number, the better the biometric identifier is for the application.
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4.1.5.4. Zephyr charts
One of the techniques used for comparative analysis of biometrics is the ZephyrTM
chart. This chart has four factors to consider for various biometric identifiers. Then
by connecting the four points for different identifiers, each identifier would have an
area covered. The decision on which identifier to choose is then made based on the
size of the covered areas. Figure 3 shows an example of these charts for four
biometric identifiers: Iris, Finger, Voice and Face, based on four criteria: effort,
intrusiveness, cost and accuracy. The criterion to choose the identifier is to get the
biggest possible area of A.

Figure 3 – An example of a Zephyr chart
Source: Bolle, R. M., et al. (2004). Guide to biometrics. New York: Springer-Verlag

However, it should be noted that this is not a general description of biometrics for all
applications in every situation; it is a sample chart, which describes the features for a
specific application in a particular population. In effect, each application in specific
circumstances will have its own Zephyr chart with different values for the measured
features.
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4.1.6. Attacks to biometric systems
Like many other systems, biometric systems are vulnerable to attacks from forgers
and criminals who try to illegally authenticate themselves in the system or prevent it
from functioning. Although attacking biometric systems is not as easy as that of
user/password systems, there are several types of attacks that can affect biometric
systems in different ways. Nonetheless, they can be prevented, to a large extent, by
following suitable measures.
Considering the structure of a biometrics authentication system, one can point out
some points of attacks, where attackers may try to start their intrusion. Figure 4
shows the structure of a typical biometric authentication system, as well as the attack
points, which are described here.

Figure 4 – Points of attack in a generic biometric authentication system
Source: Bolle, R. M., et al. (2004). Guide to biometrics. New York: Springer-Verlag

! This is the biometric scanner, where biometric samples are acquired from people
to be matched against the samples in the database. Three attacks are probable to
occur at this point; namely Denial of Service (DoS), coercion, impersonation or
replay attacks.
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A DoS occurs when the intruder destroys the scanner in order to prevent the system
from functioning.

This can be done by breaking the scanner, blocking it or

disconnecting it from the system. Coercion is when a genuine identifier is presented
to the system, but in some unauthorized manner. For example, when someone is
forced to put his or her finger on a fingerprint scanner to be authenticated, so that the
intruder can access the person’s bank account, a coercive attack is happening.
Impersonation happens when someone tries to introduce to the system an identity
that is different from his or her true identity. To this end, an impostor may use fake
identifiers to be falsely identified as a genuine person (positive authentication.) In
fact, “the most common method of launching a fake finger attack is to build an
accurate three-dimensional model of a fingerprint from a latent fingerprint of a
legitimate user.” (Maltoni, Maio, Jain, & Prabhakar, 2003, p. 286) Fake identifiers
also happen in other biometric methods, such as changing one’s voice or altering
one’s face through simple disguises or plastic surgery.

Figure 5 – Fake fingers and fibre used by imposters
Source: Left and Middle: Maltoni, D., Maio, D., Jain, A. K., & Prabhakar, S. (2003). Handbook of
fingerprint recognition. New York: Springer-Verlag, Right: Bolle, R. M., et al. (2004). Guide to
biometrics. New York: Springer-Verlag
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Another kind of impersonation involves changing the appearance of a person’s
biometric identifier, to avoid being identified in a screening system (negative
authentication.)

Replay attacks, which could also be considered as a kind of

impersonation, happen when a previously recorded genuine sample is re-presented to
the scanner, instead of using the real biometric identifier to produce a new sample.
This is common practice in voice recognition systems where a fixed text should be
read to the system for authentication.
However, employing suitable measures can prevent the above attacks. For example,
replay attacks in a voice recognition system can be avoided by using variable texts
instead of fixed phrases. Fake identifiers can also be recognized by the use of more
accurate scanners or a combination of two or more identifiers.

For example,

regarding the impersonation attacks by using fake fingers, it is possible to use
scanners that can detect “liveness”, e.g. by making use of thermograms. Another
solution for these attacks can be to combine biometrics with “secret knowledge”, e.g.
by asking a question after the fingerprint is produced to the system, to check if the
person is really who he or she claims to be. It is also possible to lower the chance of
DoS attacks by making physically stronger scanners. Guarding the scanners can also
hinder such attacks, as well as coercive attacks. To detect coercion situations, some
measures such as detection of “panic” could also be followed.

In the case of

fingerprint recognition, there are special scanning techniques that facilitate this. It is
also possible to acquire a surveillance video of the transaction, to be further used by
law enforcement authorities.

" This is the communication channel between the scanner and the feature extractor.
Attacks at this point may be replay attacks, by electronically injecting information
into the channel, e.g. to the “output” of a microphone.
The solution to this kind of attack can be the application of strong encryption
algorithms for data communications, as well as the time-stamp method, in which the
two communicating parts check synchronization of their clocks, which is not easy to
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achieve for intrusion techniques. On the other hand, such attacks usually send
exactly the same data to the feature extractor, which is impossible in practice. As
biometric samples vary in different scans, the system would be able to detect perfect
matches against previous samples.

# This is an attack on the feature extractor itself, by using a mechanism referred to
as “Trojan horse.” In software systems, a Trojan horse is a program that is able to
fool the system by playing the role of another entity. Here, the Trojan horse is
disguised as the feature extractor, and can send whatever the intruder wants to the
biometrics matcher (C.) As it does not know the information is coming from another
entity, and not the feature extractor, the matcher accepts the output of the Trojan
horse as a valid input, based on which the rest of the authentication is done.

$ %

These are two other communication channels that connect the feature

extractor and the template database to the matcher. Attacks to these channels are
aimed at sending unreal data to the matcher, so that it produces the desired result.
Where the output data of the feature extractor should be sent to an external matcher,
as can happen in the smart cards, this can be a real problem. The application of
strong encryption algorithms can also be a solution here.

& Attacks to this point are also a kind of Trojan horse.

As the matcher decides on

the person’s authenticity, the attacker can control the matching mechanism by
replacing the matcher with a Trojan horse, so that, for example, a positive match
result is always produced for a particular person.

' This is the point where the result of the authentication process is passed to the
application, to grant or deny access to the user. Obviously, by attacking this channel,
an intruder can get the desired result; i.e. access the application. However, the
problem here can also be rooted in the system design. As in most of the systems,
there are certain users with extraordinary rights, which can override the matcher’s
decision. Such a user is usually required to handle special cases, such as the people
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who do not have fingers, in the case of fingerprint recognition, or to overcome a
lasting False Reject, by the controlling officer. Obviously, such a special access
right is a potential source of misuse by intruders, one way of which is collusion.

( ) * These points are related to the enrolment process. Each of the three can be
attacked to introduce a false template to the system, based on which the matcher
checks the validity of the scanned sample. By attacking the database itself, fake
templates can be included in the database, so that the fake persons can present their
genuine identifier to the system, and be falsely authenticated as genuine users. As
this part of the system is not in the forefront, attacks on it are called back-end attacks.
In any trial to strengthen the system against attacks, it should be considered that the
enrolment part, i.e. the back-end, is as important as the front-end.
The last point is the application itself, which is the ultimate target of the intruders
in their attacks.
There are also other kinds of attacks that aim at several points. For example, a “Hill
climbing attack” aims at attack points

$ and '.

The hacker starts with sending a

biometric sample data to the matcher, and checks the resultant score. Then by
repeatedly sending data with slight modifications each time, looks for improved
scores until the positive match is achieved.
Attacks to biometrics can always happen. In effect, where cost is not a matter of
concern, all identifiers can be threatened by impersonation attacks. However, the
technology is continuously improving.

As time goes by, commercial biometric

companies use better fake identifier recognition techniques and try to rectify the
problems. Yet, the hackers may find new ways to attack the system. This seems to
be an ongoing challenge, which also exists in non-biometric systems.
In effect, no foolproof biometric authentication system exists at present and probably
will never exist. However, this does not mean that biometrics should be avoided.

59

Like many other technologies, biometric authentication can be both safe and risky,
depending on the way it is being used.

4.1.7. Privacy rights concerns
One of the difficulties in the application of biometric systems is the problem of
privacy rights. Privacy is “the ability to lead one’s life free from intrusions, to
remain anonymous, and to control access to one’s own private information.”
(Maltoni et al., 2003, p. 45) Another definition by Anton Alterman, claims privacy
to be “a set of personal rights centred on the body as an integral part of the self,
including rights to freedom of movement, self-respect, bodily integrity, and privacy,
which create a personal zone protecting physical and emotional aspects of the self
against harm.”

Privacy is also the right to maintain control over how people

represent themselves to others, either in physical appearance or in iconic or indexical
representations. (Alterman, 2003, p. 144) Here, indexical representation of a person
means representation using the information related to them.
Biometric identification raises the issue of data privacy like other forms of
identification. The reasons are: biometric identification is very accurate, especially
in the case of the identifiers like iris and fingerprint, the related data is usually stored
in interconnected databases, and even the strongest encryption methods are likely to
be hacked.

Thus, the data collected for biometric identification is potentially

vulnerable to abuse. There are three types of privacy-related concerns with respect
to biometrics; namely privacy of information, use of information for unanticipated
applications (proscription) and unauthorized access to the information.
Regarding the first one, the individuals need to have their personal information
protected, as they have interests in it. For example, people with criminal record are
not necessarily criminals and thus, such records should not be used to discriminate
among people in a positive identification system. Proscription is a major problem in
the application of biometric systems, as, for example, it is always possible to make
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links between the biometric database and the databases used by law enforcement
authorities such as criminal databases. Application of information collected for
specific purposes in other applications is a major problem, especially when the
system is already in place and the law enforcement bodies insist on it.
The problem of illegal access to information is also a valid argument here, though it
is not exclusive to biometrics. As the biometric identification data is stored in
computer systems that are usually connected to a corporate network or even to the
Internet, it is not impossible for professional hackers to encroach upon the system
and access the information. Unscrupulous employees of the controlling firm may
also sell the data to lawbreakers or any other entity. Although proper policy setting
and choosing strong technical considerations such as the encryption methods can
help, they can never entirely solve this problem.
However, there is another aspect of privacy, which is special to the use of biometrics.
As human beings are interested in protecting their rights of physical representation
such as the way they dress, their presence in public, and their private space at home,
they are also concerned about the way they are “indexically” represented, such as the
use of parts of their bodies for authentication. The application of biometrics for
authentication suggests that people should loose this privacy right, by presenting
their body for authentication whenever the system asks them to do so. Added to the
above is the issue of religious beliefs, which may make it embarrassing or even
impossible to obtain a biometric sample. There are even some allegations that the
use of biometric recognition is “the mark of beast” by the so-called “dubious biblical
references.” (Maltoni et al., 2003, p. 46)
Using biometric samples for identification of people can also invade privacy by
releasing extra information that is not needed for authentication.

For example,

retinal vasculature can disclose diabetes or hypertension (Bolle et al., 2004, p. 223)
and HIV-positive cases. (Alterman, 2003, p. 146) Yet, new identifiers such as DNA,
if practically used, can reveal much more physiological characteristics.
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On the contrary, there is a different viewpoint in favour of biometrics, claiming that
use of biometric identifiers can provide higher levels of privacy rights, by enhancing
the integrity of the systems holding personal information.
Considering all the above discussion, whether biometrics invades privacy or not
depends on how the systems are implemented. In effect, application of biometrics is
like a two-edged sword; it can invade privacy, and it can provide privacy. If all the
relevant security measures are considered, including the technical aspects and the
human element, it can be a good tool to ensure a higher level of security and
protection of personal data. Nevertheless, a system with several weak points, such as
an unprotected database, open communications with other systems, unsafe
encryption methods and unclear policies on who may access the data, can result in
serious privacy concerns.

4.2. Cards
As the combination of biometrics and cards can be the ultimate solution for biometric
identification with high security and ease of use, and especially for the identification
and certification of seafarers, the cards and card technology concepts should also be
well thought-out.

4.2.1. Background
The application of plastic cards started in the USA in around the 1950s. (Rankl &
Effing, 2003, p. 2) This became possible due to the use of PVC as the body material
for cards, which could produce durable and stable cards, compared to paper cards. In
those days, cards were mostly used as a status symbol, which enabled the cardholders
to pay their bills through their “good name” rather than by cash. Soon, cards started
to be used as electronic cash for payments, with VISA and MasterCard leading the
way. The first generation was a simple card containing some information such as
holder’s name, card number, etc., protected by certain security features to prevent
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forgery. Operation of these cards was entirely manual and all transactions needed to
be dealt with manually, requiring lots of paperwork.

Gradually, the increasing

popularity of these cards demanded the industry to make them machine-readable. By
doing this, handling costs decreased and sellers and customers could save more time.
This also improved the security of the cards and thus diminished fraudulent practices,
which were inflicting big losses on the card issuers.
The first generation of such cards employed magnetic data storage technology using
a magnetic stripe on the back of the card. It was then possible to store the required
information on the magnetic stripe to be read and used whenever needed. Earlier, it
was quite common to use a signature for identification, but the introduction of these
cards coincided with the use of PIN codes (or numbers) instead of signatures. In a
PIN code system, the cardholder should present a secret code to the reader machine,
which compares it with a reference number for authentication. As magnetic-stripe
cards store the reference number on the card, it is possible to authenticate the
cardholder anywhere. However, the PIN code on a magnetic-stripe is accessible to
anyone, which can compromise security.
Developments in computer technology and communications made it possible to solve
this problem by online comparison of the presented code against the reference code
in the issuer’s database. This combination is still one of the most common methods
used for card-based authentication.
Nevertheless, magnetic-stripe cards have a major weakness; their information can
easily be accessed and read by everyone who can access a reader device. Progress in
microelectronics in the 1970s enabled card technology to replace magnetic stripes
with microchips in new cards, and make them smart cards. The first real patent of a
smart card was registered in France by Roland Moreno in 1974, yet it took some time
until the patent turned into an applicable real card. The field trial of smart telephone
cards in France and a pilot project conducted in Germany in 1984 and 1985 showed
that smart cards would be successful. By 1990, 60 million smart telephone cards
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were being used all over the world, rising to several hundred million in 1997. (Rankl
& Effing, 2003, p. 4)
The application of smart cards in mobile phones (GSM) after 1988 also proved to be
successful, with over 600 million subscribers in more than 170 countries until now.
Banking and payment, though more slowly, have become major fields of application
for smart cards as well. The reason behind the delayed use of smart cards in the
banking system is the need for more security. The information in a payment card
had to be coded using suitable methods, to prevent intruders from accessing the
information and making illegal modifications to it.

For this purpose, strong

cryptography techniques were needed, which came into existence a little bit later on.
The French banks were the first to introduce smart bank cards in 1984. Some other
countries also started to employ the system, after the specifications for Eurocheque
cards incorporating chips was issued in 1996. In the same year, Austria was the first
country to have a nationwide electronic purse system. As a joint effort of the three
major card issuers (Europay, MasterCard and Visa), the EMV specifications was also
an important factor, which contributed to the worldwide application of smart cards
for payment (credit cards.)

4.2.2. Card types
Cards are generally divided into three kinds; namely embossed cards, magnetic-stripe
cards, and smart cards. To achieve harmony in making and using cards, specific
standards have been developed by the International Standard Organization (ISO) for
different types of cards.

The ISO 7810 standards describe the physical

characteristics of the identification cards, which are in three different types: ID-1,
ID-2 and ID-3. Smart cards are in the first category, i.e. ID1, which is the most
common format for ID cards used worldwide.
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4.2.2.1. Embossed cards
This is the oldest method of adding machine-readable contents to cards. By making
embossed characters on the card, it is possible to transfer the contents into paper
using simple methods (by pulling a carbon copy paper over the card.) However, this
simplicity allows the card to be employed worldwide, without the need for any
reader device or communication methods. On the other hand, as already mentioned,
the huge amount of paperwork is the major disadvantage of this kind of card.
Nowadays, embossing is used in conjunction with other card techniques. In these
cards, the embossed feature is used only when reader devices and online
communications are not available.

4.2.2.2. Magnetic-stripe cards
The next in line is the magnetic-stripe cards. By including a magnetic stripe on the
card body, this card is capable of keeping certain amounts of information. The
information can then be accessed by pulling the magnetic stripe, manually or
automatically, against a scanning head in the reader/writer device. Each card may
contain 2 or 3 tracks on which data can be stored and retrieved. This is done by
changing the magnetic status of the cells in each track of the magnetic stripe. Tracks
1 and 2 are usually read-only, while track number 3 can be used in the read/write
mode. As can be seen in Figure 6, exact sizes and distances are also described in the
ISO standard 7811.
The major problem with magnetic stripe cards is that the data can be read by anyone
who has a reader device. There are certain measures that can reduce this problem,
such as the one used by German Eurocheque cards, which is to store an
unchangeable code in the body of the card, to be checked when reading or changing
the information. (Rankl & Effing, 2003, p. 17) However, such solutions require
special reader devices, which contradicts the standards and may prevent the card
from being used globally.
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Figure 6 – Composition of the data tracks in a magnetic-stripe card
Source: Rankl, W., & Effing, W. (2003). Smart card handbook. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Standard magnetic-stripe cards have a capacity of 1,000 bits or around 125 bytes.
This is apart from the read/write section, which takes up to 107 characters. Table 6
shows certain features of the tracks on a magnetic-stripe card.

Table 6 – Standard features of the three tracks on a magnetic-stripe card

Feature

Track 1

Track 1

Track 1

Amount of data

79 characters max

40 characters max

107 characters max

Data coding

6-bit alphanumeric

4-bit BCD

4-bit BCD

Data density

210 bpi (8.3 bit/mm)

75 bpi (3 bit/mm)

210 bpi (8.3 bit/mm)

Writing

Not allowed

Not allowed

Allowed

Source: Rankl, W., & Effing, W. (2003). Smart card handbook. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
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4.2.2.3. Smart cards
Smart cards are the next generation, which have significant advantages over the
magnetic-stripe cards.

A smart card is made up of an Integrated Circuit (IC)

embedded in a card body. The information is stored in the IC, which communicates
with the reader/writer devices through its contacts. Smart cards may have physical
contacts, or be contact-less, using an antenna to communicate.
Two major improvements are higher capacity and superior measures for security.
While capacities continuously increase by the advancements in microelectronics,
most smart cards have more than 256 KB (256,000 bytes) memory today, which is
much more than magnetic-stripe cards (less than 200 bytes.) The ISO 7816 describes
the characteristics of smart cards. Furthermore, because the storage medium is an
IC, it is possible to have certain security mechanisms, both on the software and
hardware sides, to protect the information and prevent unauthorized access to it.
This is in contrast with the magnetic-stripe cards, which store data on a medium that
is open to impostors.

Memory cards
Memory cards are a simplified version of smart cards, with more focus on the storage
of data. The IC in these cards comprises a memory section and a piece of software
that provides addressing and security logic. The security logic is rather simple,
mostly to protect parts of the memory from being modified. However, some more
advanced methods can be used in this part to encrypt the memory data. Figure 7
shows the typical architecture of a contact-type memory card. As can be seen, the
interface with the outside, i.e. the reader/writer device, is through the I/O contact.
Control mechanisms are connected to the IC using the ‘ctrl’ contact. The ‘Vcc’ is
used to give electric power to the IC. This is because smart cards depend on outside
sources for power. In fact, the IC in a smart card is not working all the time; it only
works when a transaction should be performed, either a read function to read
information or a write function, to add or remove or change the data on the card.
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Therefore, no permanent power is needed, and the power is given to the IC through
the ‘Vcc’ contact, while the card is in the reader device.
‘Clock’ provides clock synchronization between the card and the device, and ‘GND’
is used for ground connection.

‘ROM’ is the read-only memory that stores

permanent data related to the card issuer, the application, etc. and the ‘EEPROM’ is
the read/write memory used to store the actual information.

Both ROM and

EEPROM are kinds of memory that can keep data in them, regardless of the presence
of power in the IC.

Figure 7 – Typical architecture of a contact-type memory card
Source: Rankl, W., & Effing, W. (2003). Smart card handbook. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Memory cards are mostly designed for a single application, with predefined update
methodology, such as decreasing a counter value. This makes the cards very cheap,
and suitable for applications such as telephone cards and health insurance cards,
where the value of the counter is decreased depending on the service received.

Microprocessor cards
As the name suggests, these cards have a complete microprocessor in them. The
major advantage of microprocessor cards over memory cards is that due to the
existence of a Central Processing Unit (CPU), stronger measures can be established
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to protect the data on the card. In effect, the card behaves like a small computer,
with its own CPU, Operating System (OS), Memory, Input/Output, etc. Figure 8
shows the typical architecture of a contact-type microprocessor card.

Figure 8 – Typical architecture of a contact-type microprocessor card with coprocessor
Source: Rankl, W., & Effing, W. (2003). Smart card handbook. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

The CPU is the system’s brain, which performs all operations and calculations. If
additional data encryption methods are needed, another special purpose CPU may be
added, which is called Coprocessor or Numerical Processing Unit (NPU.) The OS in
a computer system is the most important software, which controls other programs,
and relates them to the computer hardware, by assigning system resources such as
the CPU time, memory and I/O channels to them. The OS in a card has a similar
role; i.e. the major routines and programs needed for the card to work logically. The
card OS is loaded into the ROM when the card is being produced. The EEPROM
and the contacts are almost the same as that of the memory card. However, RAM is
new; RAM is another kind of read/write memory, which is significantly fast, but
depends on power. In other words, the data remains in a RAM unit as long as the
power is connected, and thus, it can be used only as a temporary memory. In the
microprocessor smart cards, the CPU uses RAM to store operational data.
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Unlike memory cards, microprocessor cards can be used for more than one
application. Although the main part of the OS is stored in the ROM, it is possible to
have the specific information needed to operate applications in the EEPROM and
have them all function at the same time. As EEPROM is a read/write memory, new
methods allow the adding and removal of new applications, even after the card is
issued to an individual. Microprocessor cards are used in many applications, such as
credit cards.

Contact-less smart cards
Contact-less cards are not a new type, but they present a different communication
channel for the IC or microprocessor. Both memory cards and microprocessor cards
can be of contact or contact-less types. In effect, the card remains intact; only a new
interface is added to it to manage the contact-less communication with the
reader/writer devices. Figure 9 shows the typical architecture of a microprocessor
card and a contact-less interface.

Figure 9 – Typical architecture of a contact-less microprocessor card
Source: Rankl, W., & Effing, W. (2003). Smart card handbook. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

As can be seen, the added part comprises of an antenna, which is embedded in the
body of the card, plus an RF interface, contacts of which are identical to that of the
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microprocessor part. The power needed for contact-less cards is generated using the
concept of loosely coupled transformers in the electromagnetics, by using the
antenna as the electric coil. In this way, an electromagnetic field is created between
the antenna and another coil in the reader device, from which electric current is
generated in the card body.
Contact-less cards are preferred over contact cards because there are certain
problems with respect to the contacts. Contacts are sources of failure for the cards,
they might be contaminated or covered and thus prevent the card from functioning,
and the microprocessor can be damaged by the electrostatic discharge. Contact-less
smart cards also provide some advantages over contact cards at the human interface
level. This is mostly because there is no need to enter the card into a reader slot; the
RF interface can communicate with the reader interface from a distance of up to one
meter.

For instance, contact-less cards are preferable in applications such as

customer authentication in transport sector, where many people should be
authenticated in a short time. They also provide higher security as they remove the
need for the reader device to be accessible to people, who may try to prevent the
system from functioning by “forcing chewing gums or superglues into the reader
slot.” (Rankl & Effing, 2003, p. 23)
Although these cards, as well as their relevant reader devices, cost more than the
contact-type cards, maturity and mass production can lower the prices up to the level
of the contact-type cards.

4.2.2.4. Other cards
Besides the above-mentioned cards, there are always new types evolving. One
example, which is already being used, is the optical memory card.

The most

important feature of these cards is that they present much more memory, compared
to the other types. The memory of present optical cards, which amounts to several
megabytes, is a read/write-once type, which means it is possible to add data to the
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memory, but the written data can not be changed or removed. Yet, this is suitable for
some applications, such as the health care information of patients.

Like the

magnetic-stripe card, the security argument is also valid here. However, these cards
can benefit from the features of other smart cards, by employing complicated
encryption methods to protect the data from being illegally accessed.
On the other hand, today’s cards are rarely of one type. Card issuers usually try to get
the maximum benefit out of cards by combining different methods. For example, it
is quite normal to have embossed features, a magnetic stripe and a microprocessor
module on one single card. This enables the card holder to use the card where
magnetic-stripe readers are used, to present it where smart card encoders are present,
and also whenever there is no reader machine and the conventional system of
embossed cards and paper receipts is applied, e.g. onboard an airplane.

4.2.3. Card components
As already mentioned, the comprehensive description of cards is provided by the ISO
in relevant standards. According to the ISO 7810 standard, ID-1 cards have the
following dimensions:

Table 7 – Dimensions of standard ID-1 cards

Width

between 85.46 mm and 85.72 mm

Height

between 53.92 mm and 54.03 mm

Thickness

between

0.68 mm and

0.84 mm

Source: Derived from ISO standard number 7810

Card body
There are several components that make up a card. The first is the card body, which
should be made of durable material, with enough resistance to bending, twisting, and
climatic changes. Polyvinyl Chlorine or PVC is the most common material used for
the card body, with suitable features, although it is considered to be harmful for the
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environment. The other options are Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene (ABS), which is
very stable and resistant to temperature extremes, Polycarbonate (PC), which is the
same material used to make CDs and DVDs, with good durability, but low resistance
to scratches and rather expensive, and Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET.), which is
also known as Polyester. Research is on-going to find better materials.

Security measures
Cards usually have several security features, such as signature panels, where a
sample of the holder’s signature is printed, ultraviolet text, where control numbers
are printed using ultraviolet ink, and microtext, which is used to print very small text.
Microtexts need special magnifying glasses to be seen and are invisible to scanners
used by forgers. Holograms and Multiple laser images, which are techniques used to
include pictures that are visible in different lighting conditions, are also utilized to
prevent easy production of fake cards. Laser engraving, which is used to darken a
plastic layer by heating it with a laser beam, is another attempt to make cards tamper
proof. This method can be used to engrave some text or even the picture of the
holder on a card. Laser engraving is done in two different modes, namely raster and
vector, and the engraved part can be overlaid by a foil, to make it even stronger.
(Rankl & Effing, 2003, p. 35)

Chip modules
The integrated circuit or Chip module, which is the most important component of the
card, is fixed on the card body using different techniques. Chip modules are usually
placed under the contacts that form the visible surface on the card. This protects the
chip from external interfering factors, and also provides access to the microprocessor
through the contacts.
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Figure 10 – Contact surface of a smart card
Source: Left: Rankl, W., & Effing, W. (2003). Smart card handbook. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.,
Right and top: Photographed and prepared by the author

The most widely used method to secure the chip module in the card body is called

chip-on-flex, where an opening is punched in the card body so that the chip module
can be glued into it. Figure 11 illustrates the cross section of a chip being mounted
using this method.

Figure 11 – Inserting the chip module in the opening in the card body
Source: Rankl, W., & Effing, W. (2003). Smart card handbook. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

As this is the standard practice used in the semiconductor industry to place chips in
packages, the knowledge and technology is not very expensive and thus, it is cheaper
than the other methods.
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4.2.4. Smart card lifecycle
Smart cards have a defined lifecycle. According to the ISO 10202-1 standard, a
smart card passes five phases throughout its lifecycle, namely: production of the chip
and the smart card, card preparation, application preparation, card usage, and
termination. Figure 12 illustrates the phases and their interactions.

Figure 12 – The life cycle of a smart card according to the ISO 10202-1 standard
Source: Rankl, W., & Effing, W. (2003). Smart card handbook. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

In the first phase, the chip is designed and a suitable operating system (OS) for the
chip is generated. Then the chip is fabricated and part of the OS is transferred into
the ROM. The card body is also produced in this phase and, if the card is contactless, the coils are integrated into the body. The last process in this phase is to embed
the module into the card body. At the end of this phase, the ‘bare’ card is produced,
which would be used in the second phase. To improve quality and assure that any
probable error is rectified at the proper stage, there are test mechanisms in place at
each phase, mostly using special machines. The tests in phase 1 are crucial, as it
would be impossible to correct any mistake in the operating system or the internal
communications, after the card passes this phase.
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Phase 2 is where the card is further completed by adding the necessary data related to
the applications, as well as the part of the OS that should be stored in the EEPROM.
In this phase, all the application data and files that do not vary from card to card
should be stored in the card.

Thus, the card issuer should send the necessary

information to the card manufacturer, including some secret keys and important data
files. The data transfer channel between the issuer and the manufacturer should be
secure, otherwise, the security of the card system would be compromised. The data
transfer is usually done using diskettes, magnetic tapes or online communication.
After this phase, the applications should be initialized and the card should be
personalized or individualized for each user. Phase 3 includes: generating cardspecific secret data, transferring data to the smart card, and individualization, both
visually and electronically. As this phase mostly deals with individual secret data,
the operations need to be done in a secure and automated mode, with minimum
human involvement.
The secret data, such as PIN codes should be generated and stored in the card using
secure methods. A common way seems to be the creation of the PIN codes by the
manufacturer using a random code generator, and then sending the PIN using an
automated mechanism, called envelope stuffing. In this method, the PIN codes
created for each user are printed and put in envelopes using a special purpose
envelope printer. In this way, no one can see the PIN code except the person who
receives the envelope, who is the same person to whom the card is issued. To
achieve higher level of security by making sure the right person gets both, the card
and the envelope are sent to the user via separate paths.
The individualization consists of visual processes such as embossing the name,
engraving pictures and texts into the card, as well as the electrical process of loading
personal data into the microprocessor memory (EEPROM) or the magnetic stripe.
The biometric data, if applicable, is loaded into the card in this phase.
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Phase 4 of the card lifecycle is the duration when the cardholder actually uses the
card. During this time, the card should be managed by a system to control and
perform the necessary transactions by managing the data on cards. A management
system, most of all, needs a database system to control all the information related to
the issued cards. On the other hand, if a card is designed for several applications,
adding and removing various applications is done in this phase.
Phase 5 is the end of a card’s life. In effect, the duration of a card’s lifecycle
depends on the policy of the card issuers. However, a period of 5 years seems to be
the accepted standard for the lifetime of each card. After this period, the card should
be disabled by deactivating the applications on it. This can be important due to the
existence of secret information in the card. Nevertheless, issuers rarely require the
card to be submitted back to them after the expiry date. This can be considered as a
problem for the environment, as the cards should be recycled to prevent any hazard
to the environment. For example, only “in 1997, approximately 40,000 metric tons
of plastic were used in the whole world for the production of smart cards.”
Obviously, the increased popularity of the smart cards contributes to a bigger
problem with card waste.

4.2.5. Attacks on cards
A secure smart card is one that does not allow illicit access to its data. In other
words, it should be very hard to read the data for someone who is not allowed to do
so; otherwise the card would be a mere storage device. Ideally, the phrase “very hard
to read” in the above sentence could be replaced with “impossible to read.” In
reality, however, it is impossible to have a perfect security system. Each security
system might be compromised in different ways. The only possible measure is to
make the system as strong as possible.
Furthermore, time is a crucial factor when considering security of the documents.
When security measures used in a document are not continuously updated, forgers
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have enough time to find weaknesses and effective ways to compromise security.
Thus, in the continuous race between the industry and criminals, the one who has the
lead is the current winner. That is why the lifetime of a smart card is generally 3
years, which can help the industry to remain ahead of the attackers.
Attacks on smart cards can be at the social, physical, or logical levels. An attack at
the social level is directed at the people who deal with cards in the different phases of
the card lifecycle, including the workers in the card manufacturing industry and the
cardholders. Attacks at the physical level are directed at the microprocessor and
require technical equipment to provide physical access to the electric circuits on the
card. At the logical level, attackers try to find out the encryption techniques used by
the card and the weaknesses of the system, by using software techniques such as
“Trojan horses.”
On the other hand, attacks may be conducted against four major parts of the cards,
namely: card body, microprocessor, operating system and application. The attacks
on the card body mostly involve changing the information displayed on the card
body, such as the names, the validity period, etc.

Such attacks are not very

important, as the contents of a card always have the dominant importance. However,
such attacks may be needed by forgers to harmonize the appearance of a fake card
with its forged contents. The other attacks have to do with the chip and its contents.
Details of the attacks against the microprocessor and the circuits on a card is a very
technically specific subject, and has a lot to do with microelectronics, which does not
match the scope of this dissertation. However, it is possible and desirable to briefly
describe the most important attacks.
Attacks during development and production of the chip and the operating system are
usually insider attacks, as access to the location is highly restricted. Moreover, as the
required knowledge is private and very high level, the number of people who can
perform these attacks is very small. Nevertheless, there are some measures to protect
these stages from attacks, such as assigning unique numbers to chips, observation of
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security measures in the design criteria, regular inspections of the whole process,
distributing knowledge among several specialists (everybody does not know
everything) and authentication mechanisms between the chip and the machines.
On the other hand, attacks while the card is being used are more probable, as access
to the card and the chip is possible, and the required level of expertise is much lower.
Static analysis of the microcontrollers is done to extract information directly from the
chip memory, which can be prevented by encrypting the contents, adding protective
layers and following relevant measures in the design stage. On the other hand,
dynamic analysis happens while the microcontroller is operational, and thus, the
measures against them are usually combined with the software. For example, several
light micro sensors can be placed in different locations of the chip, which would
trigger a signal to the chip software explaining that the chip might be exposed to an
attack. Scrambling methods can be used to thwart illegal data access during internal
data transmissions. For instance, to avoid successful access to the transmission
channels between the CPU and RAM, the sequence of the channel lines can be
changed for each microcontroller, or even for each transaction. Frequency and
temperature monitoring techniques can also detect illegal access to the chip circuits.

4.3. Card / biometrics Combination
In the previous sections, the pros and cons of biometrics and smart cards were
mentioned.

These are both mechanisms to increase security of the systems.

Nevertheless, they do not belong to the same group of authentication methods. As
already mentioned, biometrics is “what one is”, while a smart card is “what one has”
(possession-based.)

In effect, the level of security of biometrics is higher, as

possession-based security can be compromised by illegally accessing the proof; here
the card. However, biometrics in itself is not the ultimate comprehensive solution.
Thus, a combination of smart cards and biometrics might provide a good solution.
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As already discussed in 4.1.2, security grows by combining two or more
authentication methods. On the other hand, biometric templates should be stored
somewhere, so that the system can access them at the time of performing
authentications. Based on the previous discussions, a distributed database provides
much more security than a centralized one. This is achieved by storing the biometric
templates of each person on his or her smart card. One of the results would, then, be
that the attack point 10 in Figure 4 is removed, since a centralized database of
biometric templates is not needed. In effect, the database is scatter on all cards.
Actually, smart cards and biometrics can complement each other. Using the two,
whenever authentication is needed, each person would present his or her smart card,
as well as the biometric identifier (such as fingerprint or face) to the system. A
sample of the present biometric identifier is then scanned, and then compared with
the template already on the card.

If the two samples match, the person is

authenticated and if not, he or she is rejected. This means that even when a smart
card is lost, it would not serve the finder, as the biometric sample of the bearer
should match the template on the card. In practice, by adding a third item of “what
one knows” (knowledge), card issuers can achieve the highest level of security. This
might help the system in making sure of the genuineness of the person whenever
needed.
Moreover, advanced security features of smart cards such as complicated cipher
techniques can be used to protect the biometric template stored on the card from
illegal access or changes. When the card allows the matcher to be run inside its chip
module, the biometric template does not need to leave the card. In this way, the
template is accessed only within the card, which is even more secure.
One of the common features of smart cards and biometrics is that both need
databases to keep and manage the information of their users. Such a database
normally contains identity information about each person, as well as the trustees and
rights he or she has in the system. When combining the two, it is also possible to
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integrate the databases into one. Then the biometric template is an element of the
card database, and the identity information will not be kept twice, which improves
the quality of the system. Besides, all the necessary information would be retrieved
at once, without the need for communication between two different databases.

4.4. Critique of the ILO solution
As mentioned in chapter 3.3.2, ILO decided, in the follow-ups to its latest convention
C185, to use the fingerprint as the biometric identifier and a two-dimensional
barcode on a card as the storage to be used for identification of seafarers. By this
selection, ILO has tried to minimize the costs of implementation and application of
the SID. This is because most crew-supplying States are developing countries and it
is difficult for them to set up and maintain an expensive system. The production cost
of the cards is also a matter of concern for ILO, as the seafarers would probably pay
for it. Thus, ILO is trying to introduce a biometrics system that is compatible with
the current practice in States. Furthermore, it is trying to follow the specifications set
by ICAO about inclusion of biometrics in documents, although these specifications
are only ICAO recommendations.

4.4.1. The Biometric Identifier
ILO has chosen the Fingerprint as the biometric identifier for seafarers’ identity
document by considering several aspects.

As already discussed in 4.1.5, each

application has its own requirements, which should be carefully studied in order to
make the best choice among biometric identifiers. Therefore, to evaluate the ILO
solution, one needs first to define the requirements of the application, i.e.,
identification of the seafarers.
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4.4.1.1. Application requirements
Authentication of seafarers is an application with its special requirements.

By

considering those requirements and other particulars of this process, it is possible to
draw a table such as Table 3 to show the biometric features and their importance in
the process of seafarers’ authentication.
For the purpose of this research, a small interest group was formed within the World
Maritime University, with members from the seafarers and other experienced people.
The issue was briefly explained to them and then they were asked about the
importance of biometric properties of the first three sections of Table 3. The result
of this discussion is summarized and reflected in Table 8.
The values in the first section are similar to that of physical access. The reason is
that seafarers require this authentication, and they are to certain extent, willing to
accept some drawbacks, such as “Required cooperation” for authentication, e.g. in
the case of contact sensors. Seafarers are against losing their privacy rights; but the
issue of shore leave is so important for them that they may accept a moderate level of
inconvenience, in a trade-off between privacy and facilitation of shore leave. Thus,
“Social stigma”, “Intrusiveness”, “inconvenience” and “required proximity” are set
to “medium” value. “Population missing” is not crucial here, as users of the system
are specific people and do not have other choices to switch to. However, if the
application of biometric cards is considered negative and undesirable, population
missing can affect the industry in the long run, as it can discourage younger
generations from becoming seafarers.
“Acquisition time” is not very important here as well, as the population is not very
large. The slowest methods of authentication are done within a few minutes, which
is an acceptable timing in the shipping industry. Like physical access, “Failure to
Enrol” and “Failure to acquire” have moderate importance, as they can be solved by
human intervention, although sometimes this requires extra time and effort.
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Table 8 –Application requirements for authentication of seafarers

Features
Intrinsic properties
Required cooperation
Social stigma
Intrusiveness
Population missing
Sampling properties
Inconvenience
Required proximity
Acquisition time
Failure to enroll
Failure to acquire
1:1 matching properties
# FA per 10K (FRR = 10%)
# FA per 10K (FRR = 1%)
Template size (bytes)
Technology properties
Installation cost
Continual cost
Cost per match

Importance Weighting

Numeric equivalent

medium
medium
medium
low

3
3
3
1

medium
medium
low
medium
medium

3
3
1
3
3

high
high
high

10
10
10

high
medium
medium

10
3
3

Source: Compiled by the author, based on the results of the discussions with the interest group formed
in the World Maritime University during the study

As security is one of the main causes of existence for seafarers’ identification
documents, the number of False Accepts needs to be as low as possible in both
situations, thus giving a value of “high” to both relevant features, i.e., “# FA per 10K
(FRR = 10%)” and “# FA per 10K (FRR = 1%)”. The reason why “Template size”
has a high importance is the use of distributed databases. As cards typically have
limited capacity, template size should be small enough to be stored in the card
memory. However, this can lose its importance as new technology increases card
capacities.
“Installation cost” is an important issue. As will be examined in the next chapter,
this is mainly due to the responsibility of the Nation State to issue the document,
which is the most expensive part of the project and requires considerable investments
in terms of software, hardware and the human element. The problem of installation
costs is aggravated because major crew-supplying States are among developing
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countries. Other costs can be considered as of “medium” importance because other
stakeholders require much less investment, and usually have better financial position.

4.4.1.2. Which biometric identifier?
One of the ways to compare biometric identifiers is to calculate the mismatch scores.
By following the method discussed in 4.1.5.3, it is possible to calculate the mismatch
scores for different biometric identifiers, by using the data in two tables; Table 5 and
Table 8. This gives a comparison of which biometric identifier better suits seafarers’
identification.

Table 9 – Parameters needed to calculate mismatch points for six major biometric identifiers to
be used in seafarers’ identification document (SID)

Features
Required cooperation
Social stigma
Intrusiveness
Population missing
Inconvenience
Required proximity
Acquisition time
Failure to enrol
Failure to acquire
#FA per 10K (FRR=10%)
#FA per 10K (FRR=1%)
Template size (bytes)
Installation cost
Continual cost
Cost per match

SID
(W)
3
3
3
1
3
3
1
3
3
10
10
10
10
3
3

Finger
(P1)

Face
(P2)

Voice
(P3)

Iris
(P4)

Hand
(P5)

Signature
(P6)

10
10
3
1
1
10
1
3
3
0
10
5
1
1
3

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
20
30
10
1
1
1

1
1
1
3
1
1
3
3
3
34.8
30
20
1
1
1

3
3
3
1
3
3
3
10
3
0.0
0.0
2.5
3
3
1

10
3
3
3
3
10
3
1
1
20
20
1.0
3
1
3

10
1
1
3
3
10
3
1
1
34.8
30
2.0
3
1
1

Source: Compiled and inferred by the author

After doing all the calculations, the resultant mismatch scores are as follows:

Table 10 – Mismatch scores of six major biometric identifiers for SID

Biometrics
Mismatch score (X)

Finger

Face

Voice

Iris

Hand

Signature

294

645

903

155

551

791

Source: Compiled and inferred by the author
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Table 10 suggests that based on the mismatch score calculation method, Iris is the
best biometric identifier for authentication of the seafarers, and Fingerprint
recognition is in second position. Voice and signature seem to be the worst choices,
which is a valid point compared to the previous discussions, as the two are not
distinctive and scalable enough for large populations.

4.4.1.3. ILO choice
Selection of Fingerprint as the biometric identifier for seafarers has several aspects to
consider. First of all, people usually do not have a good impression of Fingerprint
recognition, as it has long been used by law enforcement authorities, to identify or
verify criminals and lawbreakers. However, the situation is being changed. The low
cost, maturity and acceptable distinctiveness of Fingerprint recognition have made it
a good option for certain applications, even in daily life. For example, a well-known
supermarket chain in the UK has started to test a fingerprint-based payment system at
the point of sale in three of its stores. (“UK supermarket chain trials biometrics”,
2004) In effect, as time goes by, application of the Fingerprint in various sectors
may change the image in everyone’s mind.
Scientific methods of biometric evaluation show that Fingerprint is one of the best
choices. As already explained, in the evaluation of biometric identifiers using the
mismatch calculation method, Fingerprint recognition has the second position for
authentication of seafarers. Although this method suggests that iris scans is the first
choice for the SID, maturity is the winning factor of the fingerprint recognition over
the newer iris scans. In fact, fingerprint technology is given priority over others, as it
is a known experience in most countries, even though in manual form and in a
different application framework.
Having the circumstances in which ILO nominated fingerprint recognition as the
select technology, even if a comparison method was employed, concerns about cost
of production and operation were so much that the costing structure had become a

85

definitive factor. This caused iris, which is still a rather expensive technology, to
lose its status in the minds of people who decided at ILO, which resulted in the
selection of Fingerprint recognition. However, this is not a permanent situation; as
technology advances, relevant costs of certain identifiers may decrease, which could
considerably change the ranking positions.

4.4.1.4. Pattern-based or Minutiae-based?
Between the two major fingerprint matching techniques, the International Labour
Office suggested that the pattern-based method should be selected as the solution, as
it better suited the seafarers identification document in the follow-up to the seafarers’
identity documents convention (revised) on 24th of February 2004. The reasons why
this suggestion was made are mentioned to be:
1. The information obtained from a pattern-based method always fit into the
limited memory capacity on the proposed barcode, whereas the information
obtained from a minutiae-based method may not fit, thus requiring more
capacity. As the capacity is limited in the proposed card, the sample may need
to be truncated, which compromises accuracy of the fingerprint recognition.
2. The pattern-based method can use lower quality scanned samples, compared
to what is required for the minutiae-based method.

This can lower the

equipment costs.
Notwithstanding the suggestion made by the International Labour Office, as already
mentioned, the Governing Body of ILO finally selected the minutiae-based matching
method on 26th of March 2004. One of the major reasons behind this decision was
the opposition from different States against the pattern-based method, since most of
the forensic applications in various States are based on minutiae-based recognition,
thus giving it priority over pattern-based method, due to the availability of the
equipment, and the knowledge and experience to use it. Furthermore, as there are
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many companies who produce minutiae-based matching equipment, the price of such
devices is much lower than that of pattern-based method.
On the other hand, it should be considered that the above-mentioned priorities of the
minutiae-based method over the pattern-based method could be removed due to the
technology improvements. As the devices are continuously becoming cheaper, there
is no point in using lower quality scanners to get the samples. This idea proves to be
more valid by considering the fact that the biometric scanner amounts to a minor
share of the total cost. The issue of costing structure is discussed in more detail in
the following chapter.

Moreover, considering alternative methods for the

establishment of new solutions, cards are not so limited in their capacity. Therefore,
it would be easy to store the minutiae-based data on cards, even if they need slightly
more memory.

4.4.2. The Card
Regarding the document itself, ILO decided to ignore the application of magneticstripe cards or chip-cards to prevent any probable misuse of the cards against
seafarers by inclusion of hidden information in the storage. This is a measure to
follow the requirement set by Article 3, paragraph 9, which provides that all data
concerning the seafarer recorded on the document have to be visible and where not
eye-visible, seafarers should have convenient access to machines that enable them to
inspect the data. (International Labour Organization, 2003)
The chosen barcode technology by ILO restricts the card to a read-only state. In fact,
using barcode technology looks like writing a text on paper with a pen, without being
able to change it. This is true for the cards as well; when the card is issued, it is not
possible to change the information in it or add something new to it, unless the card is
changed and a new card is issued. As the information is written into the card only
once, it only suits SIDs that do not include CoC information.

87

There are certain pros and cons in this respect. For example, the potential for fraud
and forgery in the documents may decrease, as the barcode section is usually
protected by laminates and other security measures.

Furthermore, there is a

centralized control of the information written in the card, which makes it easier to
handle. This also gives more confidence to seafarers who are concerned about
probable inclusion of hidden information in the card that may be used against them,
as there is only one authority and one stage of data storage in the card.
On the other hand, this technology prevents any probable change in the usage of the
document in the future. For example, if a new instrument from ILO or IMO suggests
inclusion of CoC information in the card, then the whole document should be
changed.
Another point to consider regarding the ILO policy to minimize the costs is that
barcode technology, magnetic-stripe or smart cards are not significantly different in
terms of costing. Although this may look a little bizarre, it can be proved by taking a
look at the discussions in section 5.5.1 about costing. To have a valid discussion,
three main groups involved in the costing should be considered: Card
readers/checkers, Card issuers/updaters and seafarers. Card readers are those who
need to check the information and compare the stored biometric template with the
biometric sample obtained from the seafarers, including Port State Control
authorities,

Flag

Shipowners/companies.

State

Inspectors,

Immigration

authorities

and

The equipment used by these authorities is either a

computer equipped with biometric scanner and card reader (encoder) or a special
handheld computer specifically designed for this purpose. In either case, the card
reader is a part of the machine that reads information from a card or in the case of
memory or smart cards, also writes the necessary data on it. This part contributes to
only a small share of the value of the whole device, not more than 10 percent. Thus,
application of a higher technology, such as magnetic-stripe or smart cards, does not
have a significant effect on the price of card encoders.
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The second group, i.e. issuers/updaters, should spend a big portion of the money on
the infrastructure, software development and maintenance, which has little to do with
the type of card used. Section 5.5.1 clearly shows that for a combined SID and CoC
card, the cost of the equipment is around 20% of the whole investment required.
Thus, even if such equipment is 50% more expensive than what is needed for cards
based on barcode technology, the total costs will not change more than 10%.
Seafarers are the third group, who will face a considerable change in the cost of
cards, if they are to pay for them. Even so, the maximum cost of USD 15 for a 5year valid card compared to the seafarers’ income is not considerable at all. Thus, as
will be explained later, this seems to be a pretext to oppose the application of
biometrics.
Thus, the chosen card technology does not decrease costs and expenses very much.
Another issue is the seafarers’ right to be aware of the information stored in their
documents, which could also be provided in magnetic-stripe and smart cards. Like a
barcode, whatever is stored in a magnetic-stripe or chip can also be read by the
seafarer using a card reader device. The only information inaccessible in a smartcard
is the cryptographic data, which is related to the methods used to code and decode
the information; the same thing is valid for barcode cards, as certain codes are
embedded in the barcode, which facilitate retrieval of the information.
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Chapter 5
Integrated Seafarers’ Identity and Certificate - SIC

5.1. Introduction
In previous chapters, the original idea of a new document for seafarers to include all
information about certificates and identification of seafarers into one secure
document was discussed. At least, IMO had this view, upon requesting ILO to
develop “a Seafarers’ Identification Document as a matter of urgency, which should
cover, inter alia, a document for professional purpose, a verifiable security document
and a certification information document.” (ISPS conference resolution, item 1.)
This shows that IMO has been looking for a solution to overcome the problem of
fraud in seafarers’ certificates as well, especially after the report of the research done
by SIRC in 2001. Since then, IMO has become really concerned about fraudulent
practices in the certification of seafarers. However, ILO members, after all their
discussions on the issue, decided to ignore the last part of the above quoted
requirement of IMO, i.e. certification information. During the discussions at ILO,
some members were concerned about the time factor. They wanted to have the
convention adopted as soon as possible, and they concluded that inclusion of
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certificate information would definitely slow down adoption and the implementation
of the new convention.
Some countries such as France and Germany raised the issue of difficulties that could
arise in updating the documents if the solution was to include CoC information.
They believed that as it is necessary to update the information on the cards after
changes of functions and qualifications of seafarers, it would not be easy to perform
the updates on such a document. Other countries such as Canada, the UK and the
USA favoured optional inclusion of certificates in the card depending on the
decisions of individual members. (International Labour Organization, 2003b, pp. 7984)
Nevertheless, despite all the urgency in its adoption, the C185 convention, with only
three ratifications after a year from its adoption, seems to be away from being a
globally accepted solution.

The reason why member States do not ratify this

convention could be sought in the way the USA reacts to this issue. On the one
hand, the convention was customized for American needs, but on the other hand, the
USA has ruled out the convention, and has announced that it will not ratify the C185
convention. (“US insists,” 2004, p. 1) So, member States have hardly any incentive
to ratify the convention, because even if they do, crewmembers on their vessels still
need to obtain a visa to go ashore in the USA ports, and this is not possible before
fulfilling all the necessary formalities, including an interview. Without the USA and
other major maritime States joining, even if some other countries ratify the C185
convention, it will not be more than a regional agreement.
So far, the convention has not been successful in achieving its goal of implementing
a globally accepted seafarers’ identification document.

On the other hand,

combating fraudulent practices in the certification of seafarers is a matter of real
concern for IMO. To overcome this situation, something needs to be done, whether
by amending the C185 convention, adoption of a new instrument by IMO/ILO or
both, or any other relevant measure to appropriately address CoCs, as well as SIDs.
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Besides the position of the USA, there are some other obstacles, which prevent the
C185 convention from achieving its goals. The obligation stated in Article 2 of the
C185 convention to issue SIDs by the State of nationality of seafarers is one of the
problems. This requires States to issue the new document only for seafarers who are
nationals or permanent residents there, which may not be easy for all States, as they
may not have enough resources or the necessary administrative procedures in place
to implement the issuance system. On the other hand, sometimes it is not easy for
such States to verify that the person asking for a SID is really a qualified seafarer. In
this case, the SID would be merely an identification document like a passport.
Therefore, the SID issuer needs to somehow obtain the necessary information to
confirm the qualifications of claiming seafarers.

5.2. Electronic CoC
The implementation of an electronic CoC can solve some of the problems mentioned
earlier.

Such a document can considerably decrease fraud and forgery in the

certification of seafarers. As prescribed by SIRC in their report, the use of measures
such as smart cards and biometrics is a solution to prevent and combat fraudulent
practices in the certification of seafarers. (Seafarers International Research Centre,
2001, p. 43)
By using an electronic CoC system, fraud in certificates would decrease, since this
technology has dynamic security measures which make the documents difficult and
much more expensive to forge. An efficient electronic CoC can also help successful
implementation of SIDs.

By making a globally accepted electronic CoC and

providing a strong link between SID and CoC, all active entities in the shipping
industry would be encouraged to utilize both of them to have a good system of
identification and certification. Such a reasonable link would also solve the problem
of the restriction of issuance of identification document only by States of nationality.
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This idea can be supported by taking into account that the need for electronic CoCs is
already there in the marketplace. As a pioneer in this respect, Liberia has already
developed a system to issue a combined CoC and SID for seafarers. However, the
procedure adopted by Liberia does not comply with the C185 convention, primarily
in that Liberia issues SIDs for non-national seafarers. Although this project is still in
its test phase, it shows that a big Flag State really needs to have a secure document,
which covers both the identification and certification information of seafarers.
Nevertheless, application of electronic CoCs should be adapted to the current
practice in the shipping industry. According to the STCW convention, the original
certificates of all crewmembers should be onboard each vessel. As a measure to
prevent fraudulent practices and let inspectors check the validity of the certificates,
this requirement would be in place unless an amendment removes it. Thus, the
electronic CoC should be considered as a supplement to the original certificates of
competency. In practice, however, the positions could be the other way around; i.e.,
inspections would be done by checking the contents of the electronic CoCs and the
originals used whenever the card contents need to be verified. In this case, the
original document would be a supplement to the electronic CoC.
On the other hand, the legal aspect of using electronic CoCs should be carefully
considered. This is mainly because the electronic documents are unacceptable in
some juridical frameworks. As electronic documents are quite new, many judiciaries
do not recognize them as valid documents like paper documents. This is a potential
source of legal problems in dealing with challenges and disputes, after the
implementation and actual use of the electronic CoC. In fact, as long as the legal
authorities in various States refuse to accept the electronic CoC as a valid document,
it cannot be successfully implemented. Nevertheless, this is not the first area of
application of electronic documents. Several applications such as Banking have
already employed electronic documents and considerable advancements have been
reached in the legal aspects.

Therefore, some countries have placed electronic

documents in their legal frameworks. Yet there are many States that have not done
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this. It is then necessary for them to have the electronic CoC recognized as a valid
legal entity in their judicial system.

5.3. Integration of SID and CoC
Thus, the need for a unified solution seems to be obvious. This solution can be the
implementation of another document for CoCs or the coming up with a single
document covering both capacities. Making a comparison between the two can show
that a single document is preferable.
First of all, one single document will make the whole solution much cheaper. To
deal with electronic SID or CoC, different entities such as Port States, Flag States,
Immigration Authorities and crew-supplying States should set up platforms and pay
considerable amounts of money for hardware and software requirements.
Administrative procedures, training of personnel and maintenance also contribute a
lot to the total cost of realizing the solution. If there are two separate documents to
be handled, most of these expenses will be twice as much, plus the time and energy
needed. This is also an important issue for seafarers, as they want to pay as little as
possible; obviously one card is cheaper than two cards. It would also be much more
convenient to carry one card for both certification and identification.
Secondly, if another separate document is implemented, a part of the process is being
repeated all the time, which incurs extra costs and efforts for seafarers and related
authorities. To check the validity of a CoC, the holder of the CoC needs first to be
authenticated. In fact, a secure way is needed to link the person to the document.
This is usually done by checking a biometrics sample on the document and
comparing it with the person’s live biometrics sample at the time of authentication.
The same procedure is done while checking the identification of the seafarer.
Actually, identification is a part of CoC evaluation. Therefore, the biometric sample
and certain other personal information must be there in the electronic CoC document.
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This means the enrolment procedure, as well as digitizing and storage of the
biometrics sample must be done twice for the two documents. In doing so, different
problems may occur.

For example, if the two issuing authorities use different

methods, there might be cases where a seafarer is authenticated with one of the
documents, but rejected with the other one. This could easily happen if the relevant
authorities use different values for FAR and FRR parameters.
Nevertheless, there are some difficulties in trying to setup a single document for
identification and certification. The first one is the need for harmonization of all
seafarers’ certificates throughout all countries.

This is needed because the

information to be stored in the database and on the documents should have a similar
format, so that different States can read and write information from/to the card in a
proper and standard way.

While the STCW convention has suggested certain

formats for CoCs, such standards should be more precisely and pervasively defined.
Obviously, such harmonization is not very easily achieved and may take some time
to be implemented.
The other obstacle in building a single CoC and SID document is the coordination
needed among States of nationality and the certificate issuers.

5.3.1. How SIC should work
Having discussed the necessity of a solution for SIDs and CoCs, the focus shall now
be on the solution itself, which is supposed to be a single card, equipped with
biometrics. As a unified electronic SID and CoC, this card could be called SIC
(Seafarers’ Identification and Certificate document), which is the term used
hereinafter.
As this document should contain two sets of information, it will need more storage,
compared to the ILO-proposed document. The document should be a card, equipped
with either a magnetic-stripe or chip to hold all the necessary information.
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To understand how the integrated SID/CoC (SIC) should work, the following could
be considered as a possible procedural description.

Issuance
In the first stage of its lifecycle, the card should be produced. Two entities are
involved in this phase: the Nation State and the Flag State. The Nation State should
issue the card for its national seafarers upon their request, with information about
their identity, including personal information and necessary biometric sample(s).
Thus, the biometric enrolment process is done in the Nation State. At the same time,
the national database of seafarers, which shall be produced by the Nation State,
should be updated to include the newly enrolled seafarers. The Nation State can
have certain criteria to believe that the person is a seafarer, prior to accepting the
request to issue a SIC.
Then the seafarer has a partial SIC, which is not yet valid. The next step is to make
the card complete by adding the information about seafarer’s qualifications and
certificates. Thus, the seafarer should present his/her partial SIC to the second
authority, which is usually the maritime administration of a State where their
certificates are issued. This authority should then add to the card all the necessary
information regarding the certificates obtained by the seafarer. If the seafarer is to
work onboard a vessel from this same State, the issuance phase of the card is done.
Otherwise, there would be a third step that demands the State of registry of the vessel
to endorse the certificates already obtained by the seafarer in other States by adding a
data item to the card.

Updating
Then the seafarer has the complete SIC in hand, which should always be kept by
them. Nevertheless, the card contents may change in the second phase of the card’s
lifecycle. This normally happens when the seafarer obtains new certificates, when
validity of a certificate should be extended or withdrawn, or when the seafarer moves
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to a vessel registered in another Flag State. If the Discharge book information is also
included in the SIC, the card will need more frequent updates, including the
seafarer’s movements to other vessels or his/her roles onboard.
For the purpose of updates, a seafarer should present the card to the relevant
authorities and get it back after the card contents are revised, which brings it up-todate and valid for use.

Checking
The other operation that seems to be much more frequent than the others is checking
the validity of the card and authenticity of the seafarer. This is done by the relevant
authorities whenever they need to make sure the card bearer is a genuine seafarer and
the card contains valid information. The authentication process is done by obtaining
a biometric sample from the seafarer and comparing it to the biometric sample on the
card. Checking other information on the card may need communication with the
database where the data is kept, such as the national seafarers’ database.

Invalidation
After the definite validity period of the card, it should be invalidated and a new one
issued. A good choice for the validity period could be 5 years, which complies with
other identity documents such as a passport. Defining a reasonable validity period
can also facilitate application of the forthcoming technologies for all seafarers with a
maximum delay of five years.

5.3.2. Requirements
Taking into account the above-mentioned framework, the requirements for
successful creation and application of the integrated SID/CoC (SIC) for seafarers
should be considered.
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5.3.2.1. Coordination among States
Three States need to have coordination among themselves: the State of the seafarer’s
nationality or permanent residence, the State of issuance of seafarer’s certificate, and
the State of registration of the vessel on which the seafarer is working (Flag State.)
The reason behind this requirement is the global nature of the shipping industry with
its unique features; where it is quite common to see a vessel belonging to State X,
registered in State Y, sailing far away from X and Y, with a crew onboard from
States E and F, with certificates obtained from States G and H, and endorsed by State
Y.
Considering the three States of Nationality, Certification and Flag as A, B and C,
four possible situations may come about:

A = Nationality = Certification = Flag
In this situation, there is not much of a problem, as all responsible entities for the
three aspects are within the same jurisdiction and follow more or less the same rules
and regulations.

The coordination here is normally between the maritime

administration and immigration authorities of each State.

A = Nationality, B = Certification = Flag
Here, a national of one State (A) gets his certificates from another State (B) and
works onboard a vessel flying the flag of the same State (B.) In this case, the two
States need to coordinate activities regarding the seafarer’s SID and CoC. State B
should somehow get the necessary information about identification of the seafarer
from State A, which is the most competent authority to deal with identification of its
nationals.

There should be a practical procedure in place to facilitate this

cooperation.
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A = Nationality = Certification, C = Flag
A national of one State with certificates obtained from the same State (A), works
onboard a vessel flying the flag of another State (C). In this case, identification
information is already linked to certificates through internal procedures in State A,
but State C must endorse those certificates, as the Flag State is responsible for the
qualification of seafarers onboard their vessels.

Therefore, there should be a

procedure to make endorsement of certificates possible.

A = Nationality, B = Certification, C = Flag
The most complicated case is when a national of A gets his certificates from State B
and then works on a vessel flying the flag of State C. Here, both coordination and
endorsement mechanisms are needed; coordination between A and B and
endorsement by State C of certificates issued by State B.
Having said all this about the necessary procedures, the degree of coordination and
common procedures depend a lot on the solution acquired. On the other hand,
although many States have good relations and are interested in cooperation, there are
instances where due to political instabilities or conflicts, such coordination cannot be
achieved. Thus, it is best to choose a solution that mostly relies and depends on clear
rules and procedures.

In fact, even in using a single document for seafarers’

certification and identification, a good solution can decrease the dependency of
States on each other to a large extent.

5.3.2.2. Harmonization of certificates
If certificates are to be placed electronically on a document, data items should have
standard formats, whether in databases or on the document itself. Standard methods
for storage and retrieval of data are also needed.

The STCW convention has

introduced standard forms for certificates and endorsements by member States in
section A-I/2 of the mandatory part 1 of the STCW Code. However, these forms are
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designed for paper documents and are not precise enough for electronic documents.
For this purpose, besides the necessary information and physical format, exact
specifications of the data fields should also be defined, including their type and
length. On the other hand, in an electronic CoC, only data fields should be stored
and titles and other fixed texts should not be repeated.

5.3.2.3. Appropriate document
This seems to be an obvious requirement. Compared to the ILO solution for SIDs, a
considerable amount of information need to be stored on a SIC document, so the card
must have enough capacity.

On the other hand, unlike the identification and

biometrics data which are rather static, the data for certificates is not read-only; as
the qualifications and certificates of seafarers may change, including the addition of a
new certificate or extension or withdrawal of an existing one, the data related to
certificates on the card also require updates. Thus, an appropriate card here is
considered to be one with the ability to update information, enough capacity and
enough security measures to protect the data in it from unauthorized access or
change.
Nevertheless, the maturity of the chosen card technology should also be considered.
New technology may fulfil all the above-mentioned requirements at the highest level,
but at a very high price, thus making it impractical to utilize. Therefore, maturity
and the price of the card technology should also be considered.

5.3.3. Who is engaged?
Having the SIC implemented, there are numerous entities involved in the process of
issuance, control and use of the cards.

First of all, the governments have an

important role to play in different capacities; as Port State Control (PSC) Authorities,
as Flag State Surveyors, as identification authority in crew-supplying States, and as
issuers of certificates.
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5.3.3.1. Port States - Port State Control
PSCs are directly involved in the identification and certification of seafarers. To
fulfil their duty to prevent unseaworthy vessels from sailing (UNCLOS, Article 219)
and relying on the enforcement right given to them by the United Nation’s
Convention on the Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS) in Articles 25, 216 and 218, PSC
inspectors should be able to check the presence of enough competent crew
(according to the applicable rules and regulations) onboard each vessel calling at
their ports. They need to make sure the crew onboard the vessel under inspection are
the right persons and have the right certificates. To do this, they will need devices to
check the validity of the certificates, as well as the identity of the seafarers. Talking
about SIC, these devices would be small hand-held computers especially made for
this purpose, equipped with fingerprint scanners and card readers. Therefore, PSC
inspectors will need to receive training in the new technology as well.

5.3.3.2. Flag States - Maritime Administration
Flag States, on the other hand, have certain duties regarding crewmembers onboard
vessels flying their flag. Article 94 of the UNCLOS describes, inter alia, Flag State
responsibilities to ensure “that each ship is in charge of a master and officers who
possess appropriate qualifications …”.

To perform these duties and enforce

jurisdiction over its ships, each Flag State needs to do surveys at appropriate
intervals. Like PSC, these surveyors also involve the identification and certification
of seafarers, which justifies their need for the equipment, as well as the knowledge of
its use.

5.3.3.3. Crew-supplying States - Immigration Authorities
Crew-supplying States are the next in line. With a considerable number of seafarers
working under other flags, they are the ultimate responsible entities for identification
of their nationals and shall issue identity documents for their seafarers.

In an

integrated SIC, this entity is responsible for the identification part of the document.
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However, it also has something to do with the CoC, since the issuing authority
should be able to verify that the person who requests for the identification document
is indeed a seafarer.
To this end, crew-supplying States must have appropriate equipment to issue a new
SIC and register the identification information in it.

5.3.3.4. Registries - Maritime Administration, Certificates Section
After the introduction of the concept of open registers, many countries have turned to
this business. One of the incentives for shipowners to register their vessels in open
registers is that they usually do not have any restriction on the nationality of the
crew, thus enabling them to hire inexpensive crewmembers from different countries.
Open registers have become so popular that some of them have thousands of vessels
from shipowners all over the world, with hundreds of thousands of seafarers from
labour supplying countries.
However, the registry is responsible for the issuance of new certificates, or the
endorsement of present certificates for seafarers working onboard the vessels flying
its flag. Therefore, they will need equipment and knowledge to update the SIC and
store the most recent information of seafarer’s certificates on the document, whether
it is issuance of a new certificate or extension or withdrawal of one. In an integrated
document, this is the second phase of issuance of the SIC, which is done after the
first one, i.e. identity phase.

5.3.3.5. Shipowners/Operators
Shipowners/Operators are also involved in checking of identity and certification of
seafarers. They should employ qualified seafarers to make sure their business is safe
and secure and their capital is protected. Therefore, they also need to have necessary
tools and knowledge to check validity of the document and authenticity of the
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seafarer. Such tools for SIC should consist of, at least, a card reader and a biometric
scanner.

5.3.3.6. Seafarers
At the very basic level are the seafarers themselves, who are obviously a part of this
process. They should keep the document with them, as well as their live biometrics,
and present it to the appropriate authority in charge. After all, the whole process is to
give a better service to seafarers. Seafarers should not be abused by the inclusion of
covert information in the document against them. They have the right to know what
is exactly stored in the document (International Labour Organization, 2003) and as
electronics are not visible, seafarers would need devices, which let them see what is
in the card.

Such devices, as mentioned in ILO C185, Article 3-9, should be

conveniently accessible to seafarers. These are usually simplified versions of the
checking devices, which only read the SIC.

5.3.4. Beneficiaries
Several entities benefit from an integrated SIC, the most important of which are Flag
States, Port States, shipowners/Operators and Seafarers.
Flag States, especially big registers, have serious problems regarding fraud and
forgery in the certification of seafarers who work onboard their ships.

These

fraudulent practices in certification of seafarers will damage the reputation that
aspiring Flag States try hard to make for themselves, which is essential for them to
thrive in the market. This is mostly because shipowners have the choice to go to
other registers, if they present more reliable service regarding certification of
seafarers.
As an example, one could refer to the Panamanian Register, which has suffered a lot
due to the high rates of fraudulent practices in the certification of seafarers, which
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has led to a change in the certificate document. (“Firms Line up for Panama ID card
contract”, 2004)
By having a secure SIC, Flag States can ensure, to a large extent, quality of the
seafarers for whom they issue certificates or endorsements, which will, at the end of
the day, give them a good reputation, and more money. Furthermore, if the SIC is
successfully put into practice, open registers can register vessels with crews coming
from different nationalities, without facing the problem of shore leave for seafarers.
Port States also benefit from the SIC, but in a slightly different way. With the
surprising expansion of security concerns all over the world, which affect every
industry, ports are also trying to protect themselves from any threat, and provide a
secure and safe environment for ships.
If a globally accepted integrated SIC is in place, port authorities can make sure that
the crew onboard vessels calling at their port are genuine seafarers with enough
qualifications. This will make the port area and facilities a safer and more secure
place for the passengers, for the people working there and for the cargo being
transported, which is a good encouragement for more ships to call at the port, and
finally means more money for the port. A widespread SIC will also save money for
ports by lowering the demand for other security measures.
Further, shipowners are a beneficiary of safety and security resulting from a good
SIC, as they will secure their vessel and the crew and cargo onboard, by having
genuinely competent people in charge. Cargo owners will definitely prefer a safe
and secure vessel that would be accepted in all ports. All this means a healthy
business and greater benefit for shipowners.
Seafarers are probably the most important beneficiaries, though they are getting their
natural rights. These rights are respect from the society, safety and security in the
workplace, and facilitation of shore leave and professional movement. On the other
hand, shore leave is one of the basic rights for seafarers, which they are being refused
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in some ports. By having an internationally accepted document, besides safety and
security in the working environment, ports and immigration authorities have fewer
excuses to avoid seafarers’ the right of shore leave. This may also lead to a situation
where seafarers are also paid enough respect, as seen in other sectors such as
aviation.

5.3.5. Costs
To implement and use a SIC, there are certain expenses to be disbursed by different
authorities, namely Hardware (equipment), Software (programs and applications)
and management-ware (administrative procedures to be followed to utilize the new
system.) Putting them into another category, the costs are of two kinds; setup costs
and maintenance charges. Setup costs are mostly done only once to launch the
system, while maintenance costs are always bound to the system.

5.3.5.1. Equipment
To issue and handle cards, each entity would require different equipment, depending
on the role and capacity they have in dealing with cards. The first in line is a set of
equipment needed to produce cards at the very beginning, including Card printers
and encoders. However, the actual production in phases 1 and 2 of the card’s
lifecycle is not considered here. Instead, it would be supposed that phases 1 and 2
are performed by smart card manufacturers, and only phase 3 is carried out by the
card issuer. This is a valid assumption, as the number of seafarers in many States,
and subsequently the number of cards they need, is not so great to financially justify
establishment of a card making plant. On the other hand, some States may already
have such equipment and not need to incur any cost.
Thus, card printer/encoders are devices used to perform the procedures of the phase
3, i.e. to initialize the applications, and personalize the card. Like printers, these can
print information such as text, picture and barcode on cards, as well as holograms
and laminates to prevent forgery. The encoder part of these devices is used to store
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information in the card memory.

Printers/encoders are needed by States of

nationality to issue the SID, as well as Flag States, for issuance of CoC.
Card printer/encoders cost between USD 5,000 and USD 20,000 depending on their
capabilities and different available options. An example of these devices is HDP600
from FARGO. (Further information could be obtained on Fargo website:
www.fargo.com)
On the other hand, in a SIC system, except for its national seafarers, a Flag State is
responsible only for the certification part of the document. This means just to save,
retrieve or update information in the card, rather than issue a new card. For this
purpose, Card Encoders are used. These let Flag States add information for new
certificates, endorse a CoC obtained by a seafarer in another State, extend the
validity period of an existing certificate, or withdraw one.
The price of card encoders varies from USD 2,000 to USD 5,000 based on their
quality and capabilities. For instance, the smart card encoder packages from
CARDWERK are capable of performing smart card personalization, application
loading and card customization. (www.cardwerk.com)
After issuing the card, there are some authorities in charge of checking its validity,
the most important ones being Flag State surveyors, PSC inspectors and Immigration
authorities. Compared to the issuance and revision of information in the card, this is
a more frequent operation. On the other hand, as this is only an inspection, the
information in the card need not be changed. Here, the biometrics information stored
in the card is compared with live samples of the seafarer’s biometrics.

The

information about certificates would also be checked through another comparison, by
communicating valid databases of seafarers’ certificates maintained by Flag States.
This communication could be in different forms, such as a simple dialup Internet
connection or a wireless connection to the central station in the port for handheld
devices used by inspectors.
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Thus, relevant authorities need suitable devices to read card contents, as well as
scanning biometric samples of the seafarers and comparing them. These devices cost
around USD 2,000 on the market today. Two examples of such devices are DSVIISC and DSVerify2D from DATASTRIP, which are portable card readers equipped
with fingerprint scanners. (www.datastrip.com)
In addition to FS surveyors, PSC inspectors and Immigration authorities, shipowners,
Shipping companies and any other authority dealing with security measures may
require these devices.
As already mentioned, seafarers should have easy access to devices which let them
see what is stored on their cards. To provide the seafarers with this basic right,
issuing States and maybe shipowners/operators will need simplified card readers.
The price of such readers is approximately USD 500 to USD 1,000 today. As an
example, one could refer to the PCRead2D from DATASTRIP, which is a reader
device that connects to any computer. (www.datastrip.com)

5.3.5.2. Platform
Besides all the above-mentioned equipment needed, issuing States will have to build
robust IT (Information Technology) platforms. These are mainly computer networks
with good communications capabilities to act as the backbone of the system to
securely generate and issue cards and maintain credible databases with global
accessibility using communications channels such as the Internet.
Although some of the equipment described so far function as a standalone device,
software plays a crucial role in the whole system. The cipher algorithms, which code
and decode information, communications modules, database management programs
and design and control software, are integral parts of the system in different stages of
issuance and use of the cards.
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As the chosen and acquired platforms and software depend a lot on the State’s
present IT infrastructure and policies of the related entity, it is not easy to evaluate
related costs in this respect.

5.3.5.3. Human resource
Provision of all hardware and software components does not necessarily guarantee an
efficient or even working system; management policies and administrative
procedures play a big role. If a very good system is in place, but the legislator does
not support it, the system will never be used. On the other hand, if the system is not
well customized to meet the special requirements of individual States, it may become
a total failure. Therefore, the necessary rules and regulations should be formulated
or revised to recognize smart cards and the information therein as valid documents in
each State’s national jurisdiction. Besides the legal framework, there should be clear
and efficient administrative procedures with necessary considerations of the
situations in each State to support the utilization of new documents.
Training is another aspect of this nature. During the setup and maintenance phases,
well-trained people should be in charge of the system. They should be proficient in
the new technology, as well as current practices regarding identification and
certification of seafarers in the State. The relevant authorities should also be trained
on how to operate the equipment and devices. Public knowledge about cards and
biometrics also needs an upturn.

5.3.5.4. Maintenance
After the system starts to work, the setup costs are almost complete, but to operate it
in the proper way, software and hardware equipment needs to be maintained. This
will incur a continuous cost to related entities, especially to issuing States who have a
big share of the whole investment. Maintenance costs are also hard to estimate, as
they depend on other factors.
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5.3.5.5. Cards
Seafarers should receive and hold the card as proof of their identity. Creation of
each card has certain costs, between USD 1 and USD 15 depending on its type,
which should be paid by the seafarers, or otherwise by the issuing authority. The
higher the technology used in a card, the more expensive it will be. For example,
cards with barcodes are much cheaper than cards equipped with microchips.
However, like many other IT innovations, as time goes by, the cost of issuing each
card will decrease.

5.3.6. Obstacles
Several problems could be foreseen underway when talking about the creation of a
new entity called SIC. These range from the beginning stages of designing the
system to the final steps of implementation, but two obstacles seem to be more
significant, as already experienced in the case of ILO’s SID.

5.3.6.1. Seafarers’ influence
As the new document has to do with the identification and certification of seafarers,
one should consider their important role in this respect. The fact that the industry has
already experienced opposition against the SID implies that seafarers would not be
happy if they were to pay for the card. As GREGORIO OCA, president of the
Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP) said
at the Fifth Asia-Pacific Manning & Training conference in Manila, “… the cost of
such an initiative was always a major issue in countries such as the Philippines, the
world's largest supplier of seafarers.” He also proposes “some arrangements should
be done to allow State subsidy and cost sharing between employers, manning agents
and seafarers”. (“Union demands action on ID cards”, 2003)
On the other hand, this controversial issue shows that seafarers are discontented by
the use of biometrics in the new document. This is rooted in the idea that biometrics
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are intrusive and act in the way that human beings lose their privacy rights.
Otherwise, the price of USD 1 for a 5-year valid identity card is not a major problem
for any seafarer. Even if the more expensive smart cards, costing USD 15 maximum,
were employed, each seafarer would have to pay roughly USD 0.25 per month
during the 5-year validity period. This is not an expensive service for seafarers,
compared to the level of safety, security and services they would benefit from. Yet
the workers’ federations are probable to raise the problem of card costs on behalf of
the seafarers.

5.3.6.2. Costing
One of the obstacles, which usually causes problems in the implementation of new
standards is the financial considerations; SIC (or even SID) is no exception. Having
realized different stages of the implementation and their relevant costs, it should be
obvious that certain entities are greatly concerned with the money they should pay.
While it is not difficult for a shipowner or operator to equip their vessels with a
couple of devices for the price of USD 2,000, half a million dollars to set up the
issuance system is definitely a big deal for some developing countries, many of
which supply large numbers of seafarers to the world market.
Therefore, costing would be a big obstacle in the movement of the industry towards a
successful SIC. If this problem is not resolved and only a few States get involved,
the result will be a multilateral or regional agreement among certain States, rather
than a globally accepted solution for seafarers’ certification and identification.
Implementing a successful international SIC is possible only through active
participation of all the related entities.

5.3.6.3. Position of the USA
It should be remembered that the standpoint of the USA against the document is a
very important factor. However strong the solution is in terms of security and
however reasonable it is designed, if the USA does not accept it, the chances of
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global acceptance and implementation will diminish significantly. This is already
one of the major obstacles for the ILO proposed SID.
If the USA fails to ratify the relevant instruments and continues to insist on its visa
policy for seafarers, which requests individual seafarers to apply for, hang around a
certain amount of waiting time and finally get a visa prior to calling at a US port, the
SIC could experience the same fate as that of the SID. However, the SIC is far more
comprehensive than the SID, and there are certain features in it, such as its pervasive
nature, that can encourage the USA to look at it in a different way.

5.4. Implementation of the SIC
Implementation of the SIC is not an easy task, neither is it a short-term project. It is
a global endeavour that involves several entities and should be carefully studied,
planned and accomplished. To this end, one of the important issues to consider is the
document type and biometrics to be employed. As already argued, there is no unique
solution with regard to card technology or biometrics; each application in each
location may require a special combination of card and biometrics. However, to
come up with a global solution for identification and certification of seafarers, a
common point should be reached, where most of the requirements, if not all, are
satisfied.
At least two entities are involved in the issuance of the seafarers’ identification and
certification document (SIC): the Nation State and the Flag State. The former is
responsible for identity information, while the latter has to do with certificates of
competency (CoC) and other documents related to the qualifications of seafarers.
Thus, an important part of the job is to define how the two parts will coexist on the
same document, with regard to certain differences between the two.
First of all, the identity information is usually static and does not need updates.
Name, date of birth, nationality, etc., as well as biometric templates of a person are
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rarely changed and so, they are regarded as read-only information. For this reason,
the identity data can be stored on a read-only storage like a two-dimensional barcode,
as well as on read/write storages. The certification part, however, is quite dynamic; a
seafarer may get new certificates or may lose one, many certificates need
revalidation after some time, and if the Discharge Book is included in the SIC,
continuous updates are needed as seafarers move to other vessels or their role is
changed. This makes it impractical to store information related to certificates on a
read-only storage. In effect, they need a read/write storage like the magnetic-stripe
or microchip.
Secondly, the information related to the certificates is mostly text based, which
occupies a small portion of card memory and can be compressed very well using
software techniques to occupy even less. However, the identification information
also includes pictures and biometric templates, which need more capacity and
compress less.
Considering the above situations, it is possible for the two items to coexist in one
storage medium by assigning separate parts to each, which would be dealt with by
the different entities in charge. As a substitute, it is also possible to use two separate
storage media, one read-only for identity and one read/write for certificates. The
latter solution may have an advantage over the former, for its potential compatibility
with the current standards. For example, if the SIC needs to be compatible with the
SID cards proposed by ILO, employing a two-dimensional barcode to keep identity
information and a magnetic-stripe or microchip to store certificate information can
provide the required compatibility. This may allow the SIC card to be, though
partially, recognized by those who are already using the SID. Moreover, it can
enable ratifying States and other entities to upgrade their existing systems, instead of
starting from scratch.
On the other hand, having two storage media on a card means higher costs, resulting
in extra expenses for those who do not have systems in place. Thus, it can be said
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that the type of combination of the two data sets also depends on the number of
States ratifying the C185 convention. To make it more realistic, one should consider
the actual implementation of the SID by countries, rather than the ratification status.
In any case, as two different entities in different States are to handle the SIC cards,
there should be clear instructions and complete technical definitions on the rights and
responsibilities of each State regarding the storage media.
Considering the identity and certificate information as two separate entities, there are
some common items in both, such as name, date of birth, nationality, etc. In a
combined document like SIC, such data items should be stored only once. Thus,
shared items should be specifically assigned to one category, either identity or
certificates, which will then make a particular State eligible to deal with it.

5.4.1. Card
As discussed in section 4.2, cards have different levels of security. To achieve the
goals of the SIC and especially to prevent fraudulent practices in the certification of
seafarers, it is necessary to choose a secure card for the SIC. The best choice for this
purpose seems to be smart cards equipped with microprocessors and built-in security
logic.
These cards, as explained in section 4.2.2, provide high levels of security by using
complicated cryptography methods to encode information in the card, which prevent
access to the data in the card’s memory. Some models even allow data operations to
be done inside the card, instead of reading the card contents into a reader machine,
which makes the card even more secure, and fraud and tampering much more
difficult. Notwithstanding the high security they can provide, the cost of using these
cards may rise as an obstacle. However, alongside the technological improvements
in microelectronics, the reduction in the price of IT equipment is anticipated.
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As an alternative, simpler and cheaper versions of smart cards such as memory cards
can be used. Although these cards do not offer all the security measures present in
the microprocessor cards, they have the potential to be reliably used if relevant
security measures are observed.

These measures include employing powerful

ciphering methods and the use of a secure communication channel between the card,
the reader device and the databases.
A third choice can be the magnetic-stripe card, which is not as secure as the smart
card, because the information in it can easily be read and even modified by anyone
who has access to a reader/writer. Nevertheless, it is still possible to use these cards
to store and retrieve seafarers’ identity and certificate information in a relatively
secure mode. Here, employing powerful ciphering techniques can be a reasonable
measure to code the data on the card, but this is not a perfect security measure, as
there is always a risk for cryptograms to be hacked. The advantage of magneticstripe cards over smart cards is that they are considerably cheaper to produce and
operate. This is because of the simpler technology of magnetic stripes, which has
turned these cards into a low-cost solution.

5.4.2. Biometrics
Selection of the biometric identifier is an important issue for any application. As can
be seen in Table 10, the Iris and Fingerprint are the first and second best choices for
authentication of the seafarers. So, one may decide that Iris recognition should be
used for this purpose. However, it should be noted that the resultant scores in this
method are not enough to choose the right biometric identifier. The mismatch
calculation method can give a general idea of which biometric identifier may be
better than the others. Besides, by altering some of the parameters, or even by
changing the scores used to digitize the analogue values of “low”, “medium” and
“high”, the final mismatch scores may change. In effect, some of the parameters
used to calculate the mismatch scores may considerably change depending on the
time and place of the application.
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However, Iris and Fingerprint are the two top choices. Iris, as described earlier, is
still non-mature and thus, expensive to implement and use. Fingerprint is mature and
much cheaper, but still considered as obtrusive by most people.
Fingerprint recognition can be a good choice for two reasons. Firstly, ILO has
already discussed the use of fingerprints. This, along with the other applications of
the fingerprint in daily life, can rectify the negative perceptions about it and
introduce this biometric identifier as a good measure to enhance security. On the
other hand, compatibility with ILO’s decision to use fingerprint recognition is a
measure to avoid the change for those who have already started to use or develop
their authentication system based on the ILO standards.
Secondly, in the case of seafarers, fingerprint samples can be acquired more easily,
compared to the other biometric identifiers. For example, in comparison with iris
scanning, fingerprint sampling is done much faster and with less effort.
Considering the conditions in the aviation industry, which is ahead of the shipping
world in the field of biometrics, can also be useful. This sector of transport has
chosen face recognition as its select biometric identifier. This seems to be in contrast
with scientific findings, which suggest that face recognition is not distinctive enough
for large populations and so, its scalability gets a low score. An important point to
notice about aviation is that besides face recognition, ICAO has authorized
individual States to choose another biometric identifier, such as fingerprint to be used
in conjunction with face recognition.
This highlights the idea of strengthening the whole system by combining two (or
more) biometric identifiers.

In this way, the two biometric identifiers can

complement each other and result in a more secure system. However, it is obvious
that using more than one biometric identifier adds to the costs, requires more time
and effort and can complicate the situation. While this appears to be a good solution
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for extremely high security applications, using more than one biometric identifier to
verify the identity of seafarers can be more problematic than useful.

5.4.3. Combination
Considering a combination of cards and biometrics, there are some interrelated
aspects that should be considered. First of all, the biometric sample is stored in a
memory structure on the card. As the memory has a limited capacity, the digital
representation of the sample (the biometric template) should not take up more than a
certain amount. This also depends on the card type. For example, as the capacity of
barcode and magnetic-stripe card is much less than the chip cards, a suitable
biometric template for them should be as small as possible.
Besides its effects on the selection of biometric identifiers, the limited capacity of the
cards is also linked with the feature extraction techniques.

Emerging software

technologies make biometric templates smaller, which allow storage of bigger
samples on smaller memories. However, some of these methods may reduce security
by losing details of the biometric sample, which can result in bigger values of FAR,
and thus, lower accuracy.
Moreover, the card type can directly affect the biometrics used, in terms of security.
In barcode or magnetic-stripe cards, almost all the operations are done in the reader
device. Thus, the authentication process requires the template to be transferred from
the card memory to the reader device, which is a potential for interception by forgers.
On the contrary, chip cards equipped with processors can provide higher levels of
security, by preventing the original biometric template from leaving the card. In
other words, instead of exporting the biometric template to a reader machine and
matching it against the sensed biometric sample, the scanned biometric sample data
enters the card and the comparison is done on the card. This can, to a large extent,
prevent illegal access to the original biometric template on the card.
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5.4.4. Databases and their interconnection
Like the requirement set in ILO C185 convention, the creation of the seafarers’
databases is a necessity for the successful implementation of the SIC. This should be
done, both by the Nation State and the Flag State, to keep valid information about
seafarers for checking the validity of the documents and authenticity of the seafarers.
Although the application of smart cards and biometrics can provide a reasonable
level of security, it is always possible to have fraudulent cards, as there is no absolute
solution for forgery. Therefore, it may be necessary to check the validity of the card
contents by comparing them with the real information. This real information should,
thus, be stored and updated in a database by the issuing State when the card is issued
or updated. In this way, it would be possible for the relevant authorities to access the
database and check the validity of the information.
Regarding the SIC, there are two databases involved; one for identification
information and one to keep information about seafarers’ qualifications, neither of
which is new to the shipping world; the latter has already been addressed by IMO for
CoCs and the former has been introduced by ILO for SIDs.
The STCW convention requires all parties to “maintain a register or registers of all
certificates and endorsements … which are issued, have expired or have been
revalidated, suspended, cancelled …” and also to “make available information on the
status of such certificates, endorsements and dispensations to other Parties and
companies which request verification of the authenticity and validity of certificates
produced to them by seafarers….”
The ILO C185 convention obliges members to “ensure that a record of each
seafarers' identity document issued, suspended or withdrawn by it is stored in an
electronic database…” and to “designate a permanent focal point for responding to
inquiries, from the immigration or other competent authorities of all Members of the
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Organization, concerning the authenticity and validity of the seafarers' identity
document issued by its authority….”
However, the important point regarding the SIC is that it needs both databases, one
for verification of the seafarers’ identity and the other for checking the validity of
their certificates.

Thus, there should be either a single database covering both

categories, or two separate databases with an interconnection.
The first one does not seem to be practical, as the SIC is produced and issued by - at
least – two authorities in two phases: phase 1 by the Nation State and phase 2 by the
Flag State.

Subsequent updates may be done by both, or even by third party

authorities. If all seafarers get their certificates from their Nation State and work
there, it would be possible to have a common database for the identity and certificate
parts, but this does not usually happen. Thus, to have a common database, there
should be a shared entity between all the States, as each State has relations with a
number of others. This is not an easy goal to achieve, as there might be many
conflicts of interests.
Therefore, the second choice should be considered; each crew-supplying State should
create and maintain a database for its seafarers regarding their identity and each
Register should make and maintain a database for the seafarers onboard its vessels
concerning their certificates. The databases should be structured so that the relevant
authorities can easily access to verify both the information about identity and the
certificates of the seafarers. The structure should also guarantee uniqueness of the
information stored for each seafarers. This can be done by assigning each seafarer a
unique identifier in the databases. For example, a combination of the seafarer’s
name, date of birth and nationality can be a good identifier. Another choice can be a
unique code made up of a country code, for the issuing State, plus the serial number
on the card. By using this method, it would be possible to address a specific seafarer
in all existing databases all over the world.
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It is the duty of the DataBase Management System (DBMS), used to maintain
certificate databases, to check the validity of the identity information prior to
enrolling a new seafarer in its database, or while updating the data for an existing
seafarer. The certificate DBMS should also communicate with other certificate
databases when a certificate issued by another State is being endorsed. Therefore,
communications among databases is an important requirement of the system.
Thanks to the Internet, communication among databases can be established at a
reasonable cost. The connection channel could be provided by the port facilities, by
the ship data communications itself or by the checking devices equipped with
wireless communications.
Nevertheless, one of the most important points in relation to the databases and their
communications is protection against unlawful access, which can threaten the
security of the whole system. Without secure communication channels, the data can
be hacked and illegally used by hackers. Thus, all possible measures should be
employed to ensure that only authorized entities could access the databases.

5.5. Removing the obstacles
As mentioned in earlier discussions, the two major obstacles for implementing SIC
would be the seafarers’ negative influence and costing. Regarding the former, it
should be noted that opposition to change in an existing system, especially by those
who are closely involved in the system, is an identified issue.

However, this

resistance usually decreases when they properly understand the change and its pros
and cons. For this reason, dealing with the opposition against identity/certificate
cards by seafarers requires training, as seafarers need to know the benefits they
would gain from the new system. In today’s shipping world, where there are several
news items everyday about the problem of shore leave, seafarers would be in favour
of the SIC if they realized its potential to solve the problem of shore leave, as well as
the other benefits it can give them.
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In order to help seafarers understand the system and its benefits, it is necessary to
first convince seafarers’ unions through seminars and workshops. Actually, the more
seafarers know about the system, the higher is the chance for the SIC to succeed. In
this respect, priority should be given to major crew-supplying States.
Regarding the influence of the USA on this system, there are some measures to be
taken. For example, inclusion of certain information such as the Discharge Book can
provide more valid background information for the immigration authorities. On the
other hand, a step further is to negotiate the relevant authorities in the USA prior to
the adoption of any new instrument, to realize the situations that could actually
satisfy the needs of the USA and lead to the acceptance of the SIC.
In effect, part of the opposition of the American authorities is because of the current
widespread security problems they face, with a feeling that American interests are
being threatened by different modes of transport. If this problem is resolved, or at
least moderated in the future, acceptance of the new documents by the USA can be
expected.
Notwithstanding the importance of other obstacles, costing could be considered as
the most demanding problem in the actual implementation of the SIC, which needs to
be studied in more detail. The following discussions try to analyze the issue and
examine possible solutions for it.

5.5.1. Costing
Notwithstanding the importance of other factors, the more demanding obstacle
regarding the SIC would be costing. To come up with any solution for this problem,
one needs to carefully consider different stakeholders and their relationships. As
already described, there are several entities that need to pay for hardware, software
and human element. Some of these entities are able and willing to invest in the SIC,
while some others may be either unable or not willing to pay.
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The amount of money stakeholders should invest depends on their role in the whole
process. This can be measured by considering the operations they would perform on
the SIC cards, biometrics and the seafarers’ database.

Table 11 shows the

stakeholders and their respective roles.
As identity checking is a combination of card operation (Read) and scanning the
biometric sample, it requires additional equipment or peripherals. On the other hand,
as each State should create a database containing valid information for checking
validities and the authenticity of seafarers, stakeholders should also deal with this
issue. For most of the entities, which only need to access the database to read
information, this is not very costly, especially by considering cheap communication
methods available. However, two entities will have to create the database and keep it
up-to-date, which demands considerable amounts of money.

Table 11 – Role of SIC stakeholders

Operation on
the card

Create and
update
card

Read
card
contents

Check
identity

Create and
update
database

Read
database
contents

Port State Control

+

,

,

+

,

Flag State Surveyors

+

,

,

+

,

Shipowners/companies

+

,

,

+

,

Immigration authorities

+

,

,

+

,

Crew-supplying States

,

,

,

,

,

Registers

,

,

,

,

,

Seafarers

+

,

+

+

,

Stakeholder

Source: Compiled and inferred by the author

As can be observed in Table 11, crew-supplying States and registers are the two
stakeholders with the maximum role, and consequently, more burdens on their
shoulders.
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5.5.1.1. Estimated costs
To go further to the issue of costing, there should be an estimate of the amount of
money that each stakeholder should invest to enter this business. As there are
different devices with varying prices for each purpose in the market, in calculating
the costs, the higher price threshold is considered. This is to have all potential
requirements of the relevant entity covered, without any shortcoming in security.
Besides, the estimation does not cover training and maintenance required for actual
operation of the system. The main focus of this section is the implementation phase.

Port States
To perform the inspections each PSC inspector needs to have a hand-held device to
check the cardholder’s biometrics and card contents, approximately USD 2,000 each.
The important point here is that PSC inspections are usually delegated by authorities
to Recognized Organizations (RO); yet, the ultimate responsibility lies with maritime
administrations. Therefore, they need to have the required equipment and knowledge
to observe the inspections to ensure the quality of the RO's job. Considering an
average number of 5 inspectors for each port, then:
Equipment Cost = 5 x 2,000 = 10,000 USD

Flag State surveyors
Similar equipment is needed here, approximately USD 2,000 for each surveyor. Flag
State surveys are usually delegated to Classification Societies (CS), but the maritime
administration is responsible for making sure this is being done properly. Thinking
about roughly 20 surveyors to each maritime administration, the cost would be:
Equipment Cost = 20 x 2,000 = 40,000 USD
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Shipowners/companies
At least one system is needed, either a computer equipped with the necessary
peripherals or a standalone system for authentication of the seafarers and checking
their certificates. These devices would cost less than USD 2,000 for each ship. As
an example, the same considered for Port State Control can also be used here.
Moreover, ships may also require an Internet connection to access the seafarers’
databases, but as the checking is usually done when the ships are in ports, this is not
a significant cost for ships.
If it is required by the Flag State, ships should also set up a card reader device
onboard to let seafarers read their cards. This would cost each ship an extra USD

1,000. Thus, the total cost for each ship could amount to:
Equipment Cost = 1,000 + 2,000 = 3,000 USD

Immigration authorities
What immigration authorities usually need to do is to make sure of the seafarers’
identity, which is done by biometric authentication of the cardholder. Thus they will
need devices for this purpose, of a cost of about USD 2,000 each.

While

immigration authorities can use portable machines, they are also capable of using
cheaper devices that are not standalone, but connect to a computer, since they usually
have their offices equipped with computers.

Crew-supplying States
The most complicated costing structure belongs to the crew-supplying States. As
these should issue the cards, they need to have the platform and all necessary
equipment to produce blank cards, then to personalize them and subsequently to
issue each seafarer a card. In addition, they need to enrol seafarers in a biometric
system, transfer biometric templates to the cards, and create and continuously update
a national database of seafarers.
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For this reason, it is not very easy to estimate the costs for this stakeholder, although
rough figures can be calculated. As already mentioned, for the purpose of this study,
the process of creating blank cards (phases 1 and 2 of the smart card life cycle) is put
aside. Thus, it is supposed that the crew-supplying States will use 3rd party, readymade blank cards and would not involve in the process of producing blank cards. In
this condition, only card printer/encoders are needed, which cost maximum USD

20,000 each.

Approximately 5 such devices might be needed for each crew-

supplying maritime administration.
On the other hand, the establishment of a platform for issuing SIDs will need a
computer network linked to the Internet, as well as a database management system to
handle seafarers’ database, which would cost around USD 200,000 to set up and
make operational.
Equipment Cost = 200,000 + 10 x 10,000 = 300,000 USD

Registers
A simplified system as described for crew-supplying States is needed for Registers.
To deal with cards, registers need card encoder devices, which cost around USD

5,000 each, as they should update card contents regarding seafarers’ certificates.
Each Flag State would require around 10 devices of this kind. The required platform
for Registers should include a network linked to the Internet, as well as a database
management system to keep and handle information about certificates issued by that
State. Such a platform would cost registers roughly USD 100,000.
Equipment Cost = 100,000 + 10 x 5,000 = 150,000 USD
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Seafarers
Seafarers may or may not need to pay for their card, depending on the regulations set
by individual governments. The cost of issuing the most expensive card for each
seafarer would be around USD 15 for a five-year period.

5.5.1.2. Acceptability
Port State control inspections are mainly done by ROs as a service for money paid by
Port States. Thus, ROs should also enter this business. Nevertheless, this could be
considered as an upgrade to the service they provide for Port States, which could be
compensated by an increase in the prices. As a result, Port States pay only a fraction
of the real cost they would have paid without using ROs. In effect, the investment of
Port States for the SIC, which is estimated around USD 20,000 for each port (refer to
section 5.5.1.1), is not a big deal.
This is also a valid discussion regarding Flag State Inspections; maritime
administrations that delegate the job to Recognized Organizations will pay only a
fraction of the actual cost. Thus, albeit they are not as rich as ports, they will not be
in trouble to pay the one time cost of USD 40,000. For shipowners/companies, USD
3,000 is an acceptable cost, compared to the other expenses of having a vessel in
service.
Immigration authorities are the next in line. Logically, they will have to pay for the
necessary equipment, as they are the ones who wish to authenticate seafarers.
Otherwise, they may decide not to use biometric identity cards, and verify the
identity of seafarers based on passports or other identity documents. However, this is
not the expected approach, as one of the main reasons for the creation of SID or SIC
is the fact that seafarers are refused to go ashore is that some States do not accept the
current documents. So, upon the creation of a globally acceptable document, most
immigration authorities seem to be willing to pay for equipment that will help them
authenticate seafarers more easily and with higher levels of security.
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Crew-supplying States have the most challenging situation. In effect, these States
should pay the biggest share among all stakeholders. On the other hand, most of
them are developing countries, which makes it hard for them to justify the expenses
and eventually pay for the equipment and human element required to set up the
document issuance system. Thus, while most industrialized countries can afford to
do the job on their own, developing countries will experience major problems to
catch up with the standards.
Registers also have a significant share of the costs, but unlike crew-supplying States,
most of them are not in trouble to meet their share of the costs. These are one of the
primary beneficiaries of the SIC system and are willing to pay for the
implementation of the system that will benefit them more. The activities already
done by some open registers such as Liberia to implement a similar system can
further support this idea.
Finally, the maximum of USD 15 for each card is much less than what a seafarer
would have to pay for a visa application for one of the countries he is going to visit.
As already explained, considering a 5-year valid card, a seafarer pays around 25
cents of a US dollar per month, which seems to be tolerable. However, it may cause
some resistance in the beginning.

5.5.2. Solutions
As a result, there are some stakeholders with lower levels of expenses, who are
willing and likely to pay, and some others with a bigger share, who are either not
willing or unable to pay. Thus, a solution is needed to solve the problem by bringing
the latter entities in. The most important entities in this group are the crew-supplying
States and seafarers. To this end, several solutions could be suggested, with their
specific strengths and weaknesses.
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5.5.2.1. Only Flag States
One possible solution is to ignore the whole idea of obliging Nation States to issue
identity documents for their national seafarers.

Then, Flag States would be

responsible for issuing the SIC themselves. As Flag States were already responsible
for issuance of the CoC, the only added responsibility for them would be to include
the identity information into the document. In practice, however, the change is more
demanding for Flag States, as they would have to do the first phase of the SIC as
well, which is to issue the card. This is much more than what they had to do in the
proposed shared SIC system, i.e., to update the issued card with the certificate
information. Yet, most Flag States, especially open registers, would be willing to
pay the costs of implementing a nationwide SIC system, as they are the major
beneficiaries.
If this method is to be followed, as the Nation States are accountable for identity
documents they will have no responsibility to set up the platforms and pay for the
equipment. On the other hand, as already explained, the costing structure suggests
that the other stakeholders can afford to pay for the required expenses. In effect,
such a solution could change the whole concept of the SIC, and all previous
discussions should be revised. For example, as only one State is involved, there is no
need for coordination between two States. Many of the requirements would also be
satisfied with simple solutions, as they exist merely in the national spectrum.
However, this solution will face a real problem regarding the identity of seafarers.
As already discussed, Nation States are the most competent entity to decide on the
identity of the seafarers. Although it is possible to check seafarers’ identities through
negotiations with the Nation States, Flag States cannot achieve the same level of
confidence with regard to the seafarers’ identity. Thus, the resultant document
would not be as strong with respect to the identity section. Furthermore, some Flag
States may decide not to join, as they may see their current systems as being quite
successful.
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5.5.2.2. An international electronic card company
There are several big electronic card companies, which are already in the business,
mostly for banking applications. Some of them like the HSBC, which has over 50
times the whole international maritime workforce in its card carrying customers, are
believed to be able to do the job very easily for the whole international maritime
workforce. (Grey, 2004)
This suggests that instead of implementing the system in all crew-supplying States
and Flag States, the job could be delegated to a company, which would then issue the
documents and keep them up-to-date. This removes the need for States to buy and
install various sets of equipment, as well as the necessary knowledge to acquire such;
all the States would make use of the services provided by the relevant company.
This, in itself results in a much shorter time for the implementation of the SIC, as
well as a higher level of efficiency, due to the existing experiences of the company.
The solution is not free, as no company would give a service for free. However, as
only one entity is to set up the issuance system, a few installations at certain focal
points in different parts of the world would be enough. Thus, the total cost of
implementing the system would considerably decrease, and thus, the service
provided by the company could be much cheaper.
However, because of the limited number of installations, for many States, the cards
should be posted to the States after the card is issued or updated. Thus, there would
be a time gap between the request by a State and the actual delivery of the card,
which is a potential source of problems.
On the other hand, it is arguable whether all States accept the solutions proposed by a
company, especially in the case of security measures, such as the encryption
algorithms and other security measures used to protect the data on the card and in the
databases. This is a controversial issue, as many States prefer to have exclusive
methods regarding security measures. Design and maintenance of the databases that
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contain information about a State’s nationals may also be a matter of concern. From
the privacy rights point of view, this solution potentially leads to complex situations,
as the firm that has control over the biometric, as well as certificate data, can use
them for commercial purposes.

There is also a lasting concern about the

unanticipated use of the seafarers’ data, as it might be directed to certain authorities
that are not meant to access such information. These are also relevant issues at the
national level, but when an international company is to set up the whole system,
there may turn out to be major problems, especially by adding the political
interactions and disputes to the picture.

5.5.2.3. A fund
Another solution to consider is to set up a fund, primarily to help developing
countries to set up platforms, buy software and hardware equipment and implement
the issuance system. Providing these States with financial aids and expert knowledge
will give them the opportunity to set up the platform, implement the system and
maintain it successfully, thus strengthening the global system. The question then is
“who should contribute to this fund?”
Logically, those who benefit from the successful implementation of the system are
the best choice. As already mentioned, Registries and shipowners have considerable
interests in the successful application of a global SIC. Port States are also interested,
since such a document contributes to higher levels of safety and security in port
facilities, and would save them time and money. Hence, big Registers, shipowners
and Port States are potential contributors to a SIC fund.

5.5.3. The SIC Fund
In setting up a fund, the most important issue is to define contribution criteria, based
on which, various contributors and their shares are determined.

While careful

examinations prior to this determination can bring about successful establishment of
a fund, inappropriate conditions and unsuitable factors will result in problematic
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situations. In setting the conditions, one should have a practical approach, in that
some stakeholders, despite their crucial role, may not be willing to contribute, which
can adversely affect the whole system.

Thus, acceptability is a vital factor to

consider.
On the other hand, the receiving entities and the payment criteria should be clearly
identified, to determine who and how much should be received. There should also
be an estimation of the total amount of money that should be paid by the fund.

5.5.3.1. Donors / Recipients
In the case of the SIC Fund, as already discussed, major eligible receivers from the
SIC Fund are crew-supplying States in developing countries, which, despite their
specific economical problems, need to pay the biggest sum to implement and
maintain the issuance system. Nevertheless, some Flag States also face difficulties
with respect to setting up the card updating system.

To make the SIC more

successful, inclusion of such Flag States also seems to be a wise decision.
Potential contributors of the SIC Fund are big Registers (Flag States), shipowners
and Port States. Among the three, the latter is not easy to include in the list. As Port
States indirectly benefit from the SIC, through improvements in the safety and
security of the vessels calling at their ports, they may not be willing to contribute
unless they experience the system and its actual success.
Shipowners are the next, with a good level of acceptability. However, it would not
be easy to enforce the fund with direct involvement of the shipowners, as they are
big in number and scattered in location, which can cause many problems in the
practical implementation of the SIC. As an example, collecting the contributions
from the shipowners, itself, would be a big problem. Thus, they should be involved
indirectly, probably through a different entity. Big Flag States and especially open
Registers are the most practical stakeholders to be directly involved. With high
acceptability due to their direct connection with seafarers, big Registers are
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potentially interested in the successful implementation of the SIC.

As already

described, the SIC can benefit Registers by helping them overcome fraudulent
certificates, as well as by enabling the vessels under their flag to comfortably employ
crews from various nationalities, without the apprehension of facing problems
regarding shore leave and professional movement. On the other hand, most of the
Flag States are members of IMO and ILO, which makes it easier to have them
involved in the system, through ratification of the relevant instrument by the State.
This is not true of shipowners, who do not have such a straightforward link to the
law-making bodies.
Considering the above-mentioned issues, in order to have a more focused discussion,
it is supposed, hereinafter, that the contributing entities are the Flag States that allow
foreign crews onboard their registered vessels. As already mentioned, these are the
most probable stakeholders to pay for the fund.

5.5.3.2. Total value of the fund
Earlier discussions show that the focus of the SIC Fund should be on the
establishment of card issuance systems in developing countries, mainly for crewsupplying States and Flag States (registers), which can not afford to pay for it. Thus,
an estimate of the total cost for each country is required.
Considering the cost structure mentioned in section 5.5.1.1, each crew-supplying
State would need at around USD 300,000 to have the system implemented. If 100
States were supposed to need help from the fund to set up the issuance system, the
sum would be USD 30,000,000. On the other hand, Registers require USD 150,000
each. Considering the same number of 100 countries, the total would be USD
15,000,000. The total estimate would then be roughly USD 45 million, which should
be provided by the SIC Fund.
If the matter of seafarers turns into a crucial issue, it is possible to add another item
to the fund as a special feature to compensate seafarers for the first card issued to
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them. As already mentioned, the card cost will amount to a maximum of USD 15 for
each seafarer. Having around 1.2 million seafarers all over the world, the maximum
amount of money required would be USD 15 x 1,200,000 = USD 18,000,000. The
total value of the fund, including this special item, would total USD 63 million.

5.5.3.3. Contribution bases
The amount of money to be paid by each contributing entity needs a calculation
basis. Such a basis should be rational, so that different stakeholders find it fair and
also can satisfactorily participate in it. Obviously, an appropriate basis is necessary
for a fund to be successful.
One simple way is to divide the total value by the number of contributors and
demand equal shares from each, but this may cause an imbalance due to the different
financial capacities of various entities.

An alternative can be to base the

contributions on the economic power of the States, namely the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP.) In this way, regardless of the situations of the shipping industry in
each State, the richer countries should pay the bigger share. In effect, the States’
economic strength is definitive in this method, i.e., even if a country is very strong in
the shipping business, but not very wealthy, it will pay the lesser amount.
The alternative solution can be to base the contributions on the number of registered
vessels. This is a different method, in that it demands more active maritime States to
pay more, regardless of the economical power of the country in charge. A potential
negative outcome of this method is that it may put an extra burden on the aspiring
maritime States, like some open registers, which are trying to develop through the
shipping sector.
Another potential basis for calculation is the number of foreign seafarers onboard
each State’s registered vessels. The rationale behind this criterion is to oblige the
States that employ a cheaper work force to pay for the benefits they get out of it.
Obviously, the shipowners earn more from this opportunity, and the Registers can
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demand a share from them, through the registration fee. To justify this criterion,
another argument can also be made: Flag States normally have the responsibility to
issue documents for the seafarers working onboard their registered vessels, but as
some of them use foreign seafarers, they are actually shifting part of their duty (the
identity part of the SIC) to the Nation States; thus they should contribute to the fund,
so that the Nation States can implement the system and issue the document instead of
them.
Nonetheless, it is possible to get better alternatives by combining some of the abovementioned bases. As an example, the combination of a State’s GDP with its number
of registered vessels can result in a basis that addresses both the economic power of
the State and the benefits it gets out of the shipping industry.

To make the

calculation basis even more comprehensive, one can add the number of foreign crews
onboard a State’s registered vessels to the combination.

This leads to the

consideration of all advantageous involvements of a Flag State in the shipping
business.
Therefore, the contribution of each State can be defined as a function of a its GDP,
number of registered vessels, and the number of foreign crews onboard its registered
vessels.

C = f ( T , S , V , GDP )
C = Contribution of the State
T = Total Value of the fund
S = Number of foreign crew employed by the State
V = Number of registered vessels in the State
As a result, each State would have to pay an amount of money to the SIC Fund,
which would then be distributed to eligible crew-supplying States and Flag States.
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Further description of the contribution criteria and a sample formula is presented in
0.

5.5.3.4. Seafarers to pay
Besides the contribution criteria already mentioned, a second option could also be
chosen by the industry. As already mentioned, seafarers are one of the primary
beneficiaries of the SIC. Thus, it is possible to have them pay for it. This solution
would please the owners and other stakeholders, as they who would not need to pay,
but may also lead to opposition by the seafarers.
If this is to happen, total value of the fund should be shared among paid by all
seafarers of the States which receive money from the SIC Fund. Share of each
seafarer can be defined by dividing total value of the fund, estimated around USD 63
million, to the number of seafarers in such States. If, for example, the number of
seafarers from crew-supplying States was around 1 million seafarers, each seafarer
would have to pay around USD 63 when he/she receives the new document.
In this way, seafarers would pay after the system is implemented in their country,
while the implementation needs money beforehand. Thus, a loan may be needed for
the fund, to be remunerated after the systems are in place in each country, and
seafarers pay for the cards.

5.5.3.5. Implementation
Although the SIC Fund is aimed at helping developing States to implement the SIC
issuance system, maintenance of the system is also a matter of concern for some
States. Thus, the maintenance costs should also be considered. In fact, the fund
should be clear on what aspects it covers and what it does not. If the SIC Fund is to
cover only implementation of the SIC issuance system, each State should receive the
money once in a lifetime.

Thus, the contributors may also pay only once.
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Conversely, if the fund is to cover maintenance costs, the contributions may need to
be paid on a continuous basis.
Furthermore, it is not possible to have the system implemented at once, all over the
world.

It will take some time until the States can actually have the system

established. Likewise, States also join the fund gradually. Thus, even if the fund
covers only implementation costs, it should be operational for several years. To this
end, an organization should be created to manage the fund in harmony with its
mandates.
One of the responsibilities of this organization would be to determine the amounts of
money to be paid to different States. This could be done by acquiring a group of
experts in biometrics, IT and card technology, or by receiving professional advise
from third party organizations.

If the latter is chosen, the issue of conflicting

interests should be carefully considered.
Besides, there are various procedures that, if precisely defined and followed, can
make the fund more efficient. For example, although it is preferable that each State
has its own card production standard and ciphering method for the purpose of better
nationwide security, by using a shared method among several States, the costs would
credibly decrease.

In determining the best procedures to be followed for this

purpose, expert knowledge should be used to make sure the security and integrity of
the whole system is not compromised. As a supplementary measure, the system can
be more efficient if the States receive consultations on how to implement and
maintain the system. These can be other duties of the organization in charge.

5.5.3.6. Problems and implications
The biggest problem in front of the SIC Fund would be non-participation of the
States. The problem may deteriorate if the calculation of the contributions is not on a
globally agreed basis.

Like any other fund, collection of the money from

contributors is another problem, which demands considerable amounts of time and
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energy from the fund organization to have the due contributions paid. Political
problems also play a role here, where some States may oppose the payments by the
fund to certain States, due to the existing disputes or for other political reasons.
Another relevant issue is related to the policies of individual States regarding the
payment of contributions. As already mentioned, some States, more likely the open
Registers, may decide to demand a portion of their share of the SIC Fund
contribution from their registered vessels, by including a new item in the registration
fee. This is a measure to help States satisfy their commitment, while making profit
in the market. However, some States may choose another way; for example, a State
with a defined contribution of USD 5 million may decide not to join the fund, and
instead, invest a portion of the money to set up the system for a major crewsupplying State, from which most of its vessels employ seafarers. This allows the
State to pay much less, and at the same time, gives it a better position in the market,
due to the fact that it can avoid demanding anything from the shipowners for the
purpose of the SIC.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion

6.1. Conclusion
In today’s world, identification of seafarers is crucial to satisfy security requirements.
Moreover, seafarers’ certification is a matter of real concern, especially from the
safety point of view. These two aspects have recently become more important due to
the increasing focus on security and the fraudulent practices in the certification of the
seafarers. The result is a negative consequence for the seafarers, who are being
refused their vital right of shore leave. Although the two relevant UN organizations,
namely IMO and ILO have tried to address the issue in different ways, the problems
persist. Even the urgent initiative of ILO is suspended because the member States do
not ratify the new convention, even though it was adopted on a consensus basis. Yet,
the ILO proposed solution, by ignoring the issue of certification, leaves part of the
problem in place.
To overcome the above-mentioned problems, a proper solution should be
established, capable of addressing both relevant aspects; i.e. identification and
certification. This study tries to find a solution, by examining different aspects of the
seafarers’ identity and certificates, the new technology in IT and biometrics, and the
integration of the seafarers’ identity documents and certificates of competency.
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The study’s objectives are attained by introducing a new combined document for
Seafarers’ Identity and Certificates, or the SIC, and subsequently examining its
different aspects. The SIC is a smart card in combination with a biometric identifier,
to be initially issued by the States of nationality of seafarers, completed and
subsequently updated by the Flag State, and be used by all relevant entities such as
the immigration authorities and PSC inspectors, to authenticate seafarers and check
their qualifications.
This document is, to a large extent, capable of solving the problems of fraudulent
practices in the certification of seafarers and refusal of shore leave by some States.
However, this can happen only if the major stakeholders accept and ratify it, which is
a known requirement for any rule or regulation developed for international
implementation. In particular, success of the SIC depends on how the USA treats it,
as a big part of the problem is rooted in the refusal of shore leave in USA ports. This
has already been experienced, regarding the non-ratification of the ILO C185
convention by the USA, which is clearly in contrast with the fact that “the quest for
an internationally approved, universally recognized identity document for seafarers
was launched at the behest of the US.” (Grey, 2004)
Due to the continuous improvement of IT and microelectronics, it is very difficult to
find a comprehensive and permanent solution as the suitable technology for the SIC.
This can also influence implementation and other relevant issues. For example, all
the expenses allotted to a SIC project may need to be paid again, to acquire the newly
arrived technology. Frequent changes in the equipment and methodology can also
lead to major problems in maintenance, training and support of the systems.
Nevertheless, it is always possible to choose flexible methods, which allow gradual
upgrades whenever necessary, without having to change the whole system at once.
The results of this study suggest that using fingerprints in combination with
microchip smart cards can be a suitable solution for the time being. In order to be
compatible with the ILO proposed solution, the card can contain a barcode to store
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identity information on it. The proposed solution is also flexible in using other
biometric identifiers as a supplement to the main one.
However, probable opposition of the seafarers is not a trivial issue. As the SIC
intends to serve seafarers, the first step is to meet their satisfaction. This is possible
by assuring them that the pros exceed the cons. Yet many seafarers do not know
what a smart card is and what biometrics means.

There are also some

misconceptions that can worsen the situation, such as the idea that biometrics means
DNA sampling and authentication using biometrics would require a piece of the
body. False impressions like this can also have an impact on deterioration of the
shortage of seafarers, by discouraging potential seafarers from going to sea.
To overcome these problems, necessary training should be delivered to seafarers and
even to ordinary people, especially those in the crew-supplying States. Considering
the practical application of the SIC, seafarers should be well aware of what they are
using, what are the weaknesses of the system and how to combat potential attacks
against their biometrics and the attacks on their cards at the social level.
Notwithstanding the significance of training, when it comes to the actual
implementation of the SIC, costing is a major issue. This is especially important by
considering that ICAO has proposed a different identifier, i.e. face recognition, as
some States may need to spend twice as much to have both systems.
As most major crew-supplying States are developing countries, they might face
serious problems in setting up and maintaining the card issuance system. Yet, they
should have the expensive system in hand, as each State is the most competent
authority to issue an identity document for its nationals. On the other hand, Flag
States have already faced the requirement for an integrated solution such as the SIC;
some have even started to test a similar system, before an actual implementation in
near future. However, there are other views that disapprove of this system, due to
the incompetence of the Flag State regarding the identity information.
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Thus, there are some major beneficiaries such as open registers, who are willing to
undergo the necessary costs to have the system implemented, and on the other hand,
there are some major crew-supplying States with financial problems, which prevent
them from establishing the system. A reasonable solution should yield a balance
between these two interests. While there can be several answers to this problem, the
study suggests a fund to be established. The main contributors of the fund could be
the Flag States that employ foreign crews onboard their ships, and the main receivers
would be the crew-supplying States.
The fund is focused only on the implementation of the system and does not consider
the training and maintenance. However, for practical implementation of the system,
these aspects should also be addressed, either by adding their relevant costs to the
fund value or by any other measure, such as encouraging States to assist others attain
an appropriate level of knowledge and experience.
In conclusion, the SIC may be a good idea. To make it a good solution, all the
stakeholders in the shipping industry should take an active part, and be vigilant in
having it implemented.

6.2. Further studies
The focus of this dissertation is on examining the combination of the seafarers’
identity documents and their certificates of competency, and possible solutions for
this purpose. Obviously, actual implementation of the idea requires more detailed
investigation in some fields. As explained in 5.3.2.1, the involved States should be
coordinated. The applicable methods of that coordination should be studied and
analyzed. Harmonization of certificates is the next issue, which is a requirement for
the actual implementation of the SIC. The harmonization should be thoroughly
studied, and the resultant solution should allow all the involved States to practically
deal with the cards, both in issuance and updating the SIC and in checking the CoCs
on each card.
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Moreover, acceptability of biometrics and cards by seafarers, from the social point of
view, is a credible subject to elaborate on, as this can significantly affect the success
of the SIC among seafarers. In such a study, practical methods of improving the
seafarers’ knowledge about biometrics and cards and their pros and cons should be
considered.
The idea of the SIC FUND should also be investigated in more detail, especially the
contribution basis, the contributing stakeholders and the method of contribution,
which are matters worth expanding more.
Why does the USA not ratify a USA-customized convention? This question needs to
be academically answered. The answer could then be used in the development of
future conventions, to give them a better chance of success.
Finally, the actual methods of implementing the project, including the technical
aspects related to both biometrics and smart cards, should be examined and focused
on in a separate comprehensive study.
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Appendix 1
Sample contribution criteria for the SIC Fund
As explained in 5.5.3.3, the contributions can be calculated by using a formula,
which defines the amount of money based on several factors.
C = f ( T , S , V , GDP )
Supposing that each seafarer would pay the cost of his/her card, total value of the
fund calculated in section 5.5.3.2 is USD 45 million. This is the money that SIC
Fund needs to earn. Therefore, the factors in the above formula should be designed
in a way that the money can be shared among States that employ foreign crews. A
sample formula could be as follows:

Vf

 Sf
+
+ GDP Factor 
C = T × 

 2 × S t 2 × Vt
C = Contribution of the State
T = Total Value of the fund = 45,000,000
St = Total number of seafarers = 1,200,000
Vt = Total number of merchant vessels = 50,000
Sf = Number of foreign crew employed by the State
Vf = Number of registered vessels in the State
GDP factor = (GDP per capita – 15,000) / 1,000,000
In the above formula, the two major factors are the number of foreign seafarers, and
number of registered vessels. However, the GDP factor plays a moderating role, by
adding to or deducting from a State’s share, based on its economic power. Those
with GDP per capita of more than USD 15,000, which is an average base value,
would have to pay more, while the States with lower GDP per capita should pay less.
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Some examples:
Sf = 30,000
Vf = 5,000
GDP per capita = 30,000 - GDP factor = 0.015
C = 45,000,000 x (1/80 + 5/100 + 0.015) = 3,487,500
Sf = 10,000
Vf = 2,000
GDP per capita = 5,000 - GDP factor = – 0.01
C = 45,000,000 x (1/240 + 2/100 – 0.01) = 637,500
Sf = 100,000
Vf = 8,000
GDP per capita = 15,000 - GDP factor = 0
C = 45,000,000 x (1/24 + 8/100) = 5,475,000
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